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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 28, 2001, at 12:52 a.m., the state and citizens of
Washington executed James Elledge.' Mr. Elledge had been con-
victed and sentenced to die for murdering Eloise Fitzner in the base-
ment of a church in Lynnwood, Washington.2 The State of Washing-
ton previously convicted Mr. Elledge of homicide after he bludgeoned
a motel clerk to death in 1974 over a dispute about a bill.' Prior to
that incident, Mr. Elledge had attacked a Western Union clerk in New
Mexico and poured gasoline over her. At the sentencing hearing for
the murder of Eloise Fitzner, the jury was made aware of Mr.
Elledge's history of serious criminal behavior.
In making its decision, however, the jury was not provided any
mitigation information about James Elledge that may have merited
imposing the more lenient sentence of life in prison without parole.
For example, the jury did not know that James Elledge's childhood
was so brutal that he once asked to be kept in a reform school rather
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1. Rebekah Denn & David Fisher, Execution Leaves a Trail of Unease, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 29, 2001, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/36916
_elledge29.shtml.
2. Id.
3. Id. Mr. Elledge was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with
eligibility for parole. Mr. Elledge was on parole for this killing when he murdered Ms. Fitzner.
See Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 1719, vol. XII, State v. Elledge (Superior Court of the
State of Washington, County of Snohomish 1998) (No. 98-1-00798- 7)).
4. Id.
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than return home.' The jury never learned that James Elledge was
married, that he had two daughters, and that he had grandchildren.6
The jury was unaware that James Elledge had many friends within his
church and community. The jury was ignorant of the fact that James
Elledge had pleaded insanity in the prior homicide case.' More
important, the jury was never told that Mr. Elledge had saved the life
of a prison guard.' The jury that sentenced James Elledge knew only
part of the story about a man it condemned to die.
The death penalty is qualitatively different from any other pen-
alty in our system of criminal justice.9 Therefore, it must be applied
in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious." Death sentences
should be reliably imposed on an individualized basis.1' The presen-
tation of mitigation evidence is essential to meet these requirements. 2
Accordingly, Washington's legislature enacted a death penalty statute
that specifically provides for the presentation of mitigation evidence
and relies on this evidence for proper operation of the death penalty
scheme. 3
The Washington statutory scheme, however, contemplates an
adversarial process wherein defendants and their attorneys will vigor-
ously oppose the imposition of a death sentence. In situations where
mitigation evidence is not presented, the structure of Washington's
5. David Fisher, Elledge Set to Die August 28, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 18,
2001, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/31712_ellegel8.shtml.
6. Rebekah Denn, Dispute Embroils Killer's Request to Die, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 7, 2001, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/30451-
elledgex07.shtml.
7. Id.
8. See Speedy Rice et al., Clemency Petition Seeking Commutation of the Death Sentence
of James Elledge to Life Without Parole at 9 (hearing date Aug. 6, 2001). Mr. Elledge assisted a
guard during a prison riot, placing himself between rioting prisoners and the guard. As the
guard later stated: "When there was no one else there to help us, I'm thankful that Inmate
Elledge was there to assist, as that could have proved fatal for all of us." Id. at Exhibit 3 (Letter
of Appreciation for Inmate Elledge from Lt. C.G. Parsons).
9. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of death is quali-
tatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long."). The "death is different"
argument was first offered by Justice Brennan to support abolition of the death penalty but has
metamorphosed into a reformist argument to support rationality -based sentencing. Jeffrey Lev-
inson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38
A. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 161-62 (2001).
The authors support abolition of the death penalty. While recognizing that political capital
can be squandered by settling for less than the ultimate goal, we are willing accept alternative
strategies short of complete abolition in the interim. By correcting death penalty process defi-
ciencies, we hope some lives will be spared.
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (summarizing the holding of Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
11. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
12. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-05 (1978).
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070 (2002).
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death penalty statute fails. 4 These situations arise when a defendant
opts not to put on a defense and is a "volunteer"15 for the death pen-
alty, when the defendant's attorney provides ineffective assistance of
counsel, or when the defense is forced to make a strategic choice to
withhold mitigation evidence. The underlying legislative assumption
that defendants will vehemently fight for their lives no longer applies.
In these circumstances, the state imposes death sentences in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner, and juries are forced to impose unreliable
and nonindividualized sentences.
Part II of this article examines the United States Supreme
Court's recognition of the importance of mitigation evidence in capital
cases. Part III then focuses on the role of mitigation evidence in
Washington's death penalty scheme. The following section, Part IV,
addresses the public policy implications when mitigation evidence is
not presented. Finally, Part V proposes changes to the current sen-
tencing procedure in Washington involving capital crimes.
II. THE ROLE OF MITIGATION IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND
DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
For three decades, beginning with Gregg v. Georgia,6 the Su-
preme Court has provided states with direction regarding use of the
death penalty. The foundation of the Court's concern regarding the
death penalty is that it not be "inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner."" In Gregg, the Court informed the states that they could
meet the Court's constitutional concerns with "a carefully drafted
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate in-
formation and guidance."' 8 The Court then upheld a death penalty
statute that provided procedures permitting "the jury to consider the
circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sen-
tence."' 9 The Court specifically mentioned that the information that
could be provided to the jury included "special facts . . . that mitigate
against imposing capital punishment."20
The same day it announced the Gregg decision, the Court also
handed down a ruling invalidating a mandatory death penalty
14. See infra Part III.
15. The use of the term "volunteer" seems somewhat inapt, but it is the characterization
commonly used to describe those defendants who do not contest their cases at trial or during the
appeals process.
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. Id. at 188 (summarizing the holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
18. Id. at 195.
19. Id. at 197.
20. Id.
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scheme. 1 In Woodson, the Court found that North Carolina's statute
prevented consideration of the relevant character aspects and the re-
cord of a convicted defendant before imposition of a death sentence.22
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion stated:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circum-
stances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frail-
ties of humankind ....
[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitution-
ally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.23
This individual assessment creates a certain amount of reliability that
a particular sentence is the most appropriate."
Two years after the Gregg and Woodson decisions, the Court
provided explicit instructions in Lockett v. Ohio25 regarding what"relevant facts" should be considered in capital sentencing. Indeed,
the Court sought to furnish "the clearest guidance that the Court can
provide" regarding the substance of a death penalty statute. 6 As a
fundamental aspect of this guidance, the Court concluded that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sen-
tencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defen-
dant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death. 7
21. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. The Court's decisions in both Gregg and Woodson were
announced on July 2, 1976.
22. Id. at 303.
23. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 305.
25. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
26. Id. at 602.
27. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The "rarest kind of capital case"
refers to the possibility of the need to deter certain kinds of homicide, such as "when a pris-
oner-or escapee-under a life sentence is found guilty of murder." Id., n. 11. The Court did
not express an opinion about these types of cases. However, this type of sentence (where no
mitigation was provided) was viewed as presenting a situation where a mandatory death sentence
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The presentation of mitigation evidence is essential to provide
the adequate information a jury needs to reliably make an individual-
ized assessment regarding the application of the death penalty.28
In Buchanan v. Angelone,29 the Court further clarified its impera-
tive to the states. In considering the constitutional sufficiency of jury
instructions regarding mitigation evidence, the Court pointed to the
demarcation between the eligibility phase and the selection phase of
the capital sentencing process.3" Whether a person is eligible for the
death penalty is constrained by a requirement that the death penalty is
a proportionate penalty for a particular crime and is thus not imposed
arbitrarily and capriciously.3 At the selection phase, there is a "need
for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an in-
dividualized determination [that a death sentence is appropriate] .''2
Therefore, "[i]n the selection phase.., the sentencer may not be pre-
cluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitu-
tionally relevant mitigating evidence. ' 33 In formulating death penalty
statutes, the states "may shape and structure the jury's consideration
of mitigation as long as [they do] not preclude the jury from giving ef-
fect to any relevant mitigating evidence."34
The presentation of mitigation evidence is indispensable in en-
suring an individualized sentence determination. 31 Consequently, j u-
ries may not be prevented from considering any relevant mitigation
would be imposed. Id. In addition, the "rarest kind of capital case" was not merely one where a
defendant wished to be executed. Id.
28. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-05.
29. 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
30. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275-76. The eligibility phase comports with the guilt phase of a
bifurcated capital trial. "To be eligible for the death penalty, the defendant must be convicted of
a crime for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment." Tuilaepa v. California, 512
U.S. 967, 971 (1994). The selection phase (sentencing phase) is "where the sentencer determines
whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence." Id. at
972. "What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of
the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime." Zant v. Stephans, 462 U.S.
862, 879 (1983).
31. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275-76.
32. Id. at 276.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-
Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN.
L. REV. 95, 104-06 (1987). This article remains the definitive work on the importance of mitiga-
tion evidence in capital cases. See also Laura A. Rosenwald, Note, Death Wish: What Washing-
ton Courts Should Do When a Capital Defendant Wants To Die, 68 WASH. L. REV. 735, 750-52
(1993). The author urges the use of neutral parties to present mitigation evidence in the Wash-
ington death penalty process on behalf of defendants who refuse to offer such evidence.
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evidence presented in a case.36 Respect for human dignity--central to
our system of criminal justice-requires the consideration of mitigat-
ing circumstances as an essential part of the process of inflicting the
death penalty. The presentation of mitigation evidence is a funda-
mental requirement for a sound death penalty statute.
III. THE WASHINGTON STATUTE AND MITIGATION
The capital sentencing process intertwines individual rights of
the accused, societal interests, ethical obligations of counsel, and social
policy concerns. The presentation of mitigating evidence raises im-
portant constitutional questions and affects the overall integrity of the
imposition of the death penalty.
The Washington State Legislature enacted a death penalty stat-
ute that not only specifically provides for the presentation of mitiga-
tion evidence but also relies on this evidence for proper operation of
the entire capital scheme.37 In the eligibility and selection phases, as
well as through mandatory review, the legislature sought to promote a
system that is neither arbitrary nor capricious and that allows for more
individualized sentencing determinations.3" Under Washington's
death penalty scheme, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and the governor
depend upon mitigation evidence to constrain and guide their deci-
sionmaking 3 9
Mitigation evidence is a crucial aspect of both the eligibility and
the selection phases of Washington's death penalty scheme.4" Accord-
36. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
37. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.010-900 (2000). There are twenty-two sections
within WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95. The presence of mitigation evidence directly affects the op-
eration of nine of these sections: § 10.95.030(2) (the sentence for aggravated first-degree murder
is death when a special sentencing proceeding finds that there are not sufficient mitigating cir-
cumstances to merit leniency); § 10.95.040 (the prosecution's decision regarding whether to seek
the death penalty is affected by mitigating circumstances); § 10.95.060(4) (the question presented
for the jury's sentencing determination); § 10.95.070 (factors that the jury may consider in decid-
ing whether leniency is merited); § 10.95.080 (sentence of death imposed when jury finds that
there was not sufficient mitigating evidence to merit leniency); § 10.95.110 (the verbatim report
of the record from the trial court (containing any mitigating evidence presented) to be supplied to
the Washington Supreme Court for consideration on mandatory appeal); § 10.95.120(2) (the
presentation of the questionnaire report to the Washington Supreme Court containing the trial
court's answers regarding mitigation evidence); § 10.95.130(2)(a) (the Washington Supreme
Court must review the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the jury's determination that there
was not sufficient mitigating evidence to merit leniency); § 10.95.140 (the Washington Supreme
Court must invalidate a death sentence where it finds that there was sufficient evidence to merit
leniency).
38. See infra notes 46-77 and accompanying text.
39. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060; WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.070; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.140.
40. See discussion infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
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ing to the statute, mitigation evidence is a significant consideration in
determining whether a person is potentially eligible for the death pen-
alty at all.4 In the selection phase, the legislature explicitly gave effect
to mitigating evidence presented in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial.42 Thus, Washington's death penalty is imposed only in a par-
ticular case after a person has been convicted of aggravated first-
degree murder and "the trier of fact finds that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency .... ",43 In addition, miti-
gation evidence is pivotal to the accuracy of the Washington Supreme
Court's mandatory review and is essential for presentation in the event
of a clemency petition as well.44
A. The Eligibility Phase
The presence or absence of mitigation evidence in a particular
case is a significant factor in the prosecutor's decision to seek the death
penalty.4" A prosecutor in Washington must give written notice to a
defendant charged with aggravated first-degree murder that the death
penalty option will be pursued in the defendant's case.46 According to
the statute, the guiding force behind the decision to give this notice
occurs "when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. '47 Thus, the presentation
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040.
42. Id. § 10.95.060.
43. Id. § 10.95.030.
44. See id. §§ 10.95.100, 9.94A.885.
45. See id. § 10.95.040. A more cynical view might be that the entire death penalty appara-
tus is controlled by political actors (prosecutors and judges) who are constantly aware of the ef-
fect on their re-election prospects. Stephen Bright, a renowned capital defense lawyer and aboli-
tionist, concurs in this assessment: "Defending a poor person accused of crime will usually be
bad for a lawyer's business, but prosecuting or presiding over a celebrated murder case is almost
always good for a prosecutor's or judge's political career." Stephen J. Bright, In Defense of Life:
Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority, and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the
Death Penalty, 57 MO. L. REV. 849, 864 (1992).
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040(3). If this notice is not properly given, the prosecution
may not request that the death penalty be imposed in a particular case. Id.
47. Id. § 10.95.040(1). The decision as to whether to seek the death penalty appears to be
more complicated and at least partially dependent upon other nonstatutory factors such as finan-
cial considerations. See Lise Olsen, One Killer, Two Standards, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 7, 2001, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/34283-prosecuteO7.shtml. The article describes the differ-
ent decisionmaking processes of two prosecutors in determining whether to seek the death pen-
alty for serial killer Robert Yates. Spokane County Prosecutor Steve Tucker declined to pursue
the death penalty for thirteen murders, while then-Pierce County Prosecutor John Ladenburg
announced his intention to seek the death penalty for two murders in his jurisdiction. A mitiga-
tion packet was submitted by Yates's defense attorneys in the Pierce County prosecution, but a
court ruled that this information would not be released publicly. Yates Documents Won't Go Pub-
lic, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 6, 2002, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/
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of mitigation evidence has a substantial impact from the very start of a
potential death penalty case. Indeed, according to the statute, the ex-
tent of mitigation should control whether a case triggers the applica-
tion of the death penalty at all.
A prosecutor's initial decision regarding the eligibility of a par-
ticular defendant for the death penalty depends upon the preliminary
presentation of mitigation evidence by defense counsel. 48 Without the
presentation of mitigation evidence at this critical stage, a prosecutor
has no ability to sufficiently and objectively distinguish among aggra-
vated first-degree murder defendants. 49 A death sentence may be pur-
sued not for the "worst of the worst" but rather for those who present
no mitigation evidence. Therefore, the death penalty is sought in
situations where it may not, in fact, be warranted, and proportionality
between the crime and the punishment is lost.
When persons are charged with aggravated first-degree murder
and fail to present mitigation evidence, there is no balance, as envi-
sioned by the statute, for the prosecutor's decisionmaking. Accord-
ingly, in the absence of any mitigation evidence, the death penalty will
likely be pursued whenever a person is charged with aggravated first-
degree murder.5" Under these circumstances, eligibility for the death
penalty is virtually mandatory.
local/69271_yatesrecordsO6.shtml; David Fisher, Monroe Murder Trial To Begin, SEATTLE
POST- INTELLIGENCER, April 9, 2002, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/
65723_tria109.shtml ("Prosecutors considered asking for the death penalty on Fischer's aggra-
vated murder charge, but Prosecutor Jim Krider announced last summer he would not ask for
death because too many of the county's death sentences have overturned after expensive appeals.
'We know how difficult it is to sustain them, and this one we didn't think we would be able to,
given our (state) Supreme Court,' Krider said at the time.").
The exercise of a prosecutor's discretion to seek the death penalty has been interpreted to be
broader than the language of the statute. The Washington Supreme Court has found that the
statute allows prosecutors to "exercise their discretion in a manner which reflects their judgment
concerning the seriousness of the crime or insufficiency of the evidence." State v. Rupe, 101
Wash. 2d 664, 700, 683 P.2d 571, 593 (1984). See also State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 26-7,
691 P.2d 929, 944 (1984) (statute is not void for vagueness); State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631,
667, 845 P.2d 289, 310 (1993) (the legislature has delegated authority with adequate standards to
guide the prosecution).
48. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040(1). Capital defense experts urge attorneys in capi-
tal cases to begin to research this information immediately because "[tlhe surest way of not re-
ceiving a death sentence is to persuade the prosecuting attorney from initially not seeking a spe-
cial sentencing proceeding. The most persuasive manner in obtaining this objective is to present
a thorough, thoughtful, and competent mitigation packet to the prosecuting attorney." DEATH
PENALTY ASSISTANCE CENTER, CAPITAL CASE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, section V (titled
"Mitigation"), at http://www.defender.org/DPAC/handbook (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040. The statute provides the prosecutor with the ability to
distinguish between types of aggravated first-degree murders based upon the presence of mitiga-
tion.
50. See Olsen, supra note 47.
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B. The Selection Phase
The presentation of mitigating evidence is most important dur-
ing the selection, or sentencing, phase"' of a capital trial. Accordingly,
Washington's death penalty statute focuses on mitigation evidence
presented to a sentencing jury.52 A jury must answer the following
question in the affirmative in order for a death sentence to be imposed:
"Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found
guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not
sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?"5 3 In order to
answer this question, the statute explicitly approves the introduction
of any relevant evidence or factors for the jury to consider when decid-
ing whether leniency is merited. 4
[Prosecutors] must review mitigating evidence. The extent of that review varies dra-
matically, largely because the state has no standards on what constitutes an adequate
assessment .... Pierce County used to automatically file for the death penalty when-
ever they didn't receive a mitigation packet, which includes details based on a defense
investigation of the defendant's mental and physical health, substance abuse issues,
and family history.
Id.
51. See supra note 30.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.050(2). At least one observer has divided states into what
might be characterized as "balancing" states and "threshold" states with respect to mitigation
evidence. Samy Khalil, Note, Doing the Impossible: Appellate Reweighing of Harm and Mitigation
in Capital Cases After Williams v. Taylor, With a Special Focus on Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 193,
196 (2001). In the balancing states, the jurors are asked to balance aggravating and mitigating
evidence; in the threshold states, jurors are asked to respond to a threshold question involving
the impact of mitigation only. Id. at 195-96. The author argues that it is inappropriate in the
threshold states for the jury to look at the harm because that has already been addressed. Id.
Instead, threshold state juries are asked to focus solely on mitigation factors, Id. Given the
structure and wording of the pertinent Washington law, the statute appears to fall into the
threshold category. The author contends that in Texas, another threshold state, "[i]n cases in
which the defense attorney has failed to introduce some 'threshold' amount of mitigating evi-
dence, appellate courts should overturn Texas death sentences automatically, whatever the ag-
gravating circumstances of the crime." Id. An exception could exist where failure to present
this evidence is consistent with trial strategy. Id.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4). An affirmative answer imposes a death sentence.
Id. § 10.95.030(2). The trial court cannot "suspend or defer the execution or imposition of the
sentence." Id. § 10.95.080(1). In the absence of an affirmative answer, the sentence shall be life
in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. §§ 10.95.080(2) and 10.95.030(1). The phrasing of
this question is somewhat awkward and potentially confusing for jurors for two reasons. First,
the inquiry is misleading because it initially appears to require the defendant to prove mitigation
beyond a reasonable doubt when indeed the burden remains with the prosecutor. Second, if the
issue of mitigation has not been addressed, a reasonable juror might be unable to respond to the
question as presented.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070. There are eight factors listed in this section:
(1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juve-
nile or an adult, of prior criminal activity;
(2) Whether the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental disturbance;
(3) Whether the victim consented to the act of murder;
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The Washington Supreme Court has held, in accordance with
the mandate of the United States Supreme Court, that the "sentencer
may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to con-
sider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.""5 The Court
has interpreted this rule as an absolute: "It is irrelevant whether the
barrier to the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence exists
because of a statute, because of the sentencing court, or because of an
evidentiary ruling." 6 In order to accurately answer the consequential
question before a sentencing jury, Washington's death penalty statute
may allow exposition and consideration of any relevant mitigation evi-
dence, which might include anything that reveals information about a
capital defendant's past history, present circumstances, or character. 7
Without mitigation evidence, jurors are not provided the ade-
quate information they need to make a reliable and individualized sen-
tencing determination.5 8 States may use their death penalty statutes to
structure the way juries consider mitigation, so long as there is no vio-
lation of the absolute rule that a sentencing jury may not be precluded
from considering any relevant mitigating evidence and giving it ef-
fect." Accordingly, Washington's legislature created a structure al-
(4) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to a murder committed by another per-
son where the defendant's participation in the murder was relatively minor;
(5) Whether the defendant acted under duress or domination of another person;
(6) Whether, at the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the require-
ments of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect (how-
ever, a person found to be mentally retarded may in no case be sentenced to death);
(7) Whether the age of the defendant at the time of the crime calls for leniency; and
(8) Whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the
future.
Id. The list is nonexhaustive. Interestingly, the language of the aforementioned section does not
mention the word "mitigation."
55. State v. Finch, 137 Wash. 2d 792, 863-64, 975 P.2d 967, 1008 (1999) (quoting Bu-
chanan, 522 U.S. at 276).
56. Id. at 864, 975 P.2d at 1008 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988)).
57. CASE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 48, section X (titled "The Penalty
Phase"). The Handbook provides some examples of the so-called nonstatutory mitigation evi-
dence to present, including good guy (isolated incident); residual doubt; remorse; childhood
abuse/neglect; drug/alcohol problems; fetal alcohol syndrome; good adjustment to custody;
mercy/leniency; religious (if allowed); individual juror responsibility; educational efforts in cus-
tody; potential for rehabilitation; talents; evidence mitigating the crime (lack of premeditation,
did not conceal identity or crime, heat of passion); and acceptance of responsibility. Id.
58. Sentencing a human being to death, without any consideration of mitigating evidence,
is directly contrary to the constitutional guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 195; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-05. When no mitigation
evidence is presented, the process becomes one that "accords no significance to relevant facets of
the character and record of the individual it offends." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
59. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276; Finch, 137 Wash. 2d at 863-64,
975 P.2d at 1008.
2002] Mitigation Evidence and Capital Cases in Washington 251
lowing jurors to consider any relevant mitigation evidence.6" This
structure was not adopted to prevent jurors from considering any rele-
vant mitigation evidence. Indeed, if Washington's scheme were de-
signed in this manner, it would be contrary to constitutional require-
ments for death penalty statutes.6' When mitigation evidence is
prevented from being presented to a jury, the structure of Washing-
ton's death penalty statute fails. 62
C. The Mandatory Review Process
The legislature has mandated that the Washington Supreme
Court review all cases in which the death penalty is imposed. 63 In par-
ticular, the court must review the sentence determination made in the
lower court.64 Mitigation evidence is vital to the death penalty stat-
ute's scheme for this review of death sentences. In performing this re-
view, the Washington Supreme Court has determined that since "the
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070.
61. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276; Finch,
137 Wash. 2d at 863-64, 975 P.2d at 1008. If Washington's scheme were designed to prevent
consideration of relevant mitigating evidence, such a design would unconstitutionally exclude
"from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death, the possibility of compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind." Woodson, 428 U.S. at
304.
62. A sentencing jury is asked the following question: "Having in mind the crime of which
the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are
not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?" WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4).
Without the presentation of mitigation evidence, there is only one answer: there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. The defendant must be sentenced to death. Id. §
10.95.030(2); see also Campbell v. Kinchloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) ("To understand why it was crucial to put forth evidence in mitigation, one only need
read the question put to Campbell's jury .... In the total absence of mitigating evidence there is
only one answer to this question."); State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 41, 838 P.2d 86, 106 (1992)
(Utter, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, withholding mitigating evidence undermines the jury's ability to
consider the pivotal question it is supposed to consider during its deliberations."); Rosenwald,
supra note 35, at 750 ("If all available mitigating evidence is withheld, however, the jury has
nothing against which to balance the aggravating circumstances and a death sentence becomes
virtually automatic.").
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.100 (2002).
64. Id. § 10.95.130. In order for the court to perform a sufficient review, it must look to the
record created in the trial court. Thus, when a judgment and sentence of death is imposed, the
clerk of the trial court must prepare and transmit a verbatim report of the trial and sentencing
proceedings to the clerk of the Supreme Court. Id. § 10.95.110. This verbatim report would
contain any mitigating evidence that was presented during the lower court's proceedings. In ad-
dition, the trial court must submit a separate report in questionnaire form to the Supreme Court.
This questionnaire summarizes information about the defendant, victim, trial, sentencing pro-
ceeding, defendant's representation, chronology of the case, and information regarding the po-
tential impact of factors that may have led to passion or prejudice influencing the jury. Id. §
10.95.120. In particular, the trial court is asked whether there was evidence of mitigating cir-
cumstances and whether that evidence was credible, in the court's opinion. Id. § 10.95.120(3)(c)-
(d).
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death penalty qualitatively differs from all other punishments...
capital sentencing determinations are subjected to a correspondingly
higher degree of scrutiny than sentencing in noncapital cases."." This
heightened scrutiny means that the court should give a close and care-
ful review of the record created during the lower court proceedings.66
The primary inquiry for the court on review is "[w]hether there was
sufficient evidence to justify the jury's affirmative finding to the ques-
tion . ,,67 "[: h]aving in mind the crime of which the defendant has
been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? 68
In parsing the trial record with heightened scrutiny, the court
must therefore review any mitigating evidence presented to determine
if the jury correctly imposed a reliable and individualized sentence. If
the court finds that there were sufficient mitigating circumstances to
merit leniency, the death sentence should be invalidated and the case
remanded for resentencing.69
Without evidence of mitigation, the Washington Supreme
Court's mandatory review is significantly flawed.7" Despite using a
65. State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 888, 822 P.2d 177, 211 (1992).
66. Id. at 888, 822 P.2d at 211. Despite this mandate, there has been criticism of the
Washington Supreme Court's review of death penalty cases. In an August 2000 report that was
revised in February 2001, the ACLU of Washington concluded that "Washington's capital pun-
ishment system-particularly the Washington Supreme Court's review of death sentences-also
is fraught with error." ACLU of Washington, Sentenced to Death: A Report on Washington Su-
preme Court Rulings in Capital Cases 1-2 (2001), available at http://www.aclu-
wa.org/ISSUES/criminal/Death.Penalty.Report.8.00.html. This report determines that seven
out of eight Washington cases reviewed in the federal courts have been overturned due to error, a
rate significantly higher than the 40 percent rate nationwide. Id. at 3 (citing James Liebman,
Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,
available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(a) (2002).
68. Id. § 10.95.060(4). The wording of this section, combined with the language of the
question the jury answered, creates an interesting inquiry for the court. The court appears to be
asked to decide if there was sufficient evidence to determine that there was not sufficient evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances. The court also must review the sentence to determine if the
death penalty was brought about by passion or prejudice or whether the defendant was mentally
handicapped. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(c)-(d). In addition, the court must review the death sentence to
determine if it "is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, consider-
ing both the crime and the defendant." Id. § 10.95.130(2)(b). This is seemingly intended to be a
review of the eligibility phase of the process since proportionality is tied to the prohibition of an
arbitrary or capricious application of the death penalty. The court, however, assesses cases "in
which the judge or jury considered the imposition of capital punishment." Id. This would be a
review of the selection phase of those cases where the issue is one of individualized assessment,
not proportionality.
69. WASH. REV. CODE§ 10.95.140(1)(a) (2002).
70. State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 42-43, 838 P.2d 86, 107 (1992) (Utter, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[t]he failure to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital
case causes additional problems. First, it undermines our statutorily mandated duty to conduct
proportionality review.").
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"higher degree of scrutiny" when reviewing capital cases, the court is
not able to make the assessment envisioned by the death penalty stat-
ute because it must review the record created at the lower court. 1 Un-
fortunately, if there never was any mitigation evidence entered into
that record, there is no mitigation evidence for the court to review.
The same is true if the court reviews the questionnaire record from the
trial court.72 If no mitigation evidence was presented to the trial court,
the Supreme Court has nothing to examine, no matter what degree of
scrutiny is utilized.73
In the absence of mitigating evidence at the trial level, on manda-
tory review the Supreme Court must always determine that the jury
finding was correct-that there was not sufficient evidence to merit
leniency.74 Thus, the principal issue for the court on review is prede-
termined. Just as the jury could answer the question presented to it in
only one way, the court is also forced to answer the question regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence one way and uphold a death sentence.
The court's function to ensure the reliability of the jury's decision is
meaningless, and the legislature's system for mandatory review is use-
less.
D. Clemency Proceedings
Under the Washington Constitution, the governor is provided
the power to issue pardons.76 Recently, the Ninth Circuit determined
that gubernatorial clemency authority is a power that is "plenary and
final" and immune from review by the state courts.77 The clemency
and pardons board was established by the legislature "[t]o assist the
governor in gathering the facts necessary to the wise exercise of this
71. WASH. REV. CODE§ 10.95.110.
72. Seeid.§ 10.95.120.
73. See Carter, supra note 35, at 129 ("Mitigating evidence is crucial precisely because it is
presented at the trial level .... The judgments of an appellate tribunal are of necessity limited to
the record."). But see State v. Dodd, where mitigation was provided by amici on appeal and the
court did examine this information. Rosenwald, supra note 35, at 751.
74. Rosenwald, supra note 35, at 751.
75. See, e.g., Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 25, 838 P.2d at 98 ("Dodd chose not to present miti-
gating evidence at the sentencing hearing .... Based upon the record before us, we can only
conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that 'there are not sufficient miti-
gating circumstances to merit leniency ... '). Most recently, in Elledge, the court stated, "[t]his
case is unique in that Elledge presented no mitigating evidence .... Given the complete absence
of any mitigating evidence, and the presence of several severe aggravating circumstances, we hold
that the jury was justified in its determination that leniency was not merited." Elledge, 144
Wash. 2d at 77-79, 26 P.3d at 280-81.
76. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9.
77. Malcolm v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2002).
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power . ".."78 The board is permitted to receive clemency petitions
"from individuals, organizations, and the department for review and
commutation of sentences and pardoning of offenders in extraordinary
cases, and shall make recommendations thereon to the governor.""
Because the wording of the statute provides for third-party
standing to request clemency, there is an opportunity for a full review
of the circumstances of death row inmates, even without the coopera-
tion of these individuals. Evidence of mitigation may be provided to
the board even where there was no information of this type given to
the prosecutor or presented for consideration by the jury."0
While it is theoretically possible for a third party to make out a
case for clemency when the individual is, for example, a death penalty
"volunteer," it is certainly more challenging. Crucial medical and
psychiatric records may be restricted without a signed release. Family
and friends who would normally want to assist in saving the life of a
loved one are conflicted about doing so against the expressed wishes of
the condemned person who, even at this final stage, exerts influence
over the outcome.
Current Washington Governor Gary Locke has acknowledged
the formidable nature of the clemency power: "The most solemn and
grave responsibility a governor has is the power to spare the life of a
person sentenced to death."8" The open-ended nature of the clemency
process in Washington is totally dependent upon the good faith of the
board and the governor's office to ensure its proper functioning as a
check on arbitrary and capricious sentencing.82 Locke, a former King
78. 1999 Wash. Laws 323, § 3.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.885(1) (2002).
80. One of the advantages of a broadly worded statute such as exists in Washington is the
opportunity to present any information to the board that may be relevant to its determination
whether to recommend clemency. Evidence of mitigation was presented to the board in both the
Sagastegui and Elledge clemency petitions. See Petition of Katie Vargas Seeking Commutation
of the Death Sentence of Jeremy Sagastegui at 1-6; also Petition by Murder Victims' Families for
Reconciliation et al.; Petition Seeking Commutation of the Death Sentence of James Elledge at 8-
11, Elledge (No. 01-67342).
81. Press release, Locke Will Not Intervene in Jeremy Sagastegui Case, Oct. 12, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.govemor.wa.gov/press/press-view.asp?pressRelease=759&newsType=1.
82. The two most recent petitions in the Sagastegui and Elledge cases that were submitted
to the clemency board were based on third-party requests and relied heavily on mitigation evi-
dence not presented previously due to the defendants' desire to be executed. The board accepted
the mitigation information and voted 2-2 in Sagastegui in October 1998 on the issue of recom-
mending clemency to the govemor. Sagastegui Put to Death, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998,
available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display
?slug=saga&date=19981013. In August 2001, the board was divided 3-2 in Elledge against mak-
ing a recommendation of clemency to the governor. Janet Burkitt & Gina Kim, Elledge Is Exe-
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County prosecutor, handled homicide cases and consequently has a
heightened awareness of the legal, practical, and policy implications of
the death penalty.83 But past experience such as his is not a job re-
quirement. This gubernatorial clemency power-the ultimate safe-
guard-could be exercised by a chief executive who, no matter how
well-intentioned, is not knowledgeable about the complex nuances of
the capital process.
E. The Impact of Mitigation: Examples
Washington's legislature sought to follow the guidance of the
United States Supreme Court in maintaining the state's death penalty
statute.84 When no mitigation evidence is presented, the careful struc-
ture created by the legislature falls apart and the state's scheme be-
comes a system operating contrary to its design.
Presentation of mitigating evidence in Mr. Elledge's case may
have made a difference in the jury's decision. One juror commented
that if he had known more about Mr. Elledge's circumstances, he may
have voted for life imprisonment instead of death; the juror said, "I
could have seen it changing my mind."8" A mitigating circumstance
or mitigating evidence is defined as "[a] fact or situation that does not
justify or excuse a wrongful act or offense but that reduces the degree
of culpability and thus may reduce... the punishment."86  The
Washington Supreme Court has defined mitigating evidence as "that
which 'in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or re-
ducing the degree of moral culpability.'87 Mr. Elledge was a "volun-
teer" for the death penalty. He "literally request[ed] to be put to
death."88 Because Mr. Elledge sought the death penalty, he prevented
presentation of mitigating evidence in his case.
83. Ralph Thomas & David Postman, The Case That Helped Shape Locke: Governor Draws
on His Experiences as Prosecutor, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2000, available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=lock06m
&date=20000906
84. See House Journal, 47th Leg. Sess. 398 (Wash. 1981). State Representative Schmidt
stated that the objective of revising Washington's death penalty statute was "to provide this state
with the strongest, most constitutionally sound death penalty statute that can be produced."
The statute as revised at that time (1982) is the current death penalty statute in Washington
(with relatively minor changes since 1982).
85. Denn, Dispute Embroils Killer's Request to Die, supra note 6.
86. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (7th ed. 1999).
87. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 671, 904 P.2d 245, 269 (1995) (quoting State v. Bar-
tholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 647, 683 P.2d 1079, 1088 (1984)).
88. Matthew T. Norman, Standards and Procedures for Determining Whether a Defendant Is
Competent to Make the Ultimate Choice-Death: Ohio's New Precedent for Death Row "Volun-
teers," 13 J. L. & HEALTH 103, 105 (1999).
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The introduction of mitigation evidence has not prohibited
Washington juries from imposing death sentences. For example,
Darold Stenson was found guilty of murdering his wife and business
associate.8 9 During the sentencing phase of the trial, a mitigation spe-
cialist presented mitigation evidence on behalf of Mr. Stenson.9 ° In
addition, Mr. Stenson was allowed to introduce "all character and
background evidence ... and any circumstances of the crime which he
wished to present."91  Despite presenting mitigation evidence, Mr.
Stenson was sentenced to death.92
On the other hand, offering mitigation evidence apparently has
made a difference to juries in other Washington cases. In the so-called
Wah Mee Massacre case, presentation of mitigating evidence by one
defendant-and the failure to present mitigation evidence by another
defendant-led to sentences of life for the former, and death for the
latter.93 In separate sentencing proceedings for the murders of thirteen
people, defendant Ben Ng introduced mitigation evidence, while de-
fendant Kwan Fai Mak presented "[e]ssentially no mitigating evi-
dence."94 Ng received a life sentence without parole. 95 Mak was sen-
tenced to death.96 Both men were eligible to receive the death penalty
for the same crimes. The presentation of mitigation evidence appears
to have determined whether they were selected for a death sentence.
IV. TROUBLESOME SITUATIONS IN WASHINGTON INVOLVING
MITIGATION EVIDENCE
Despite the importance of mitigation evidence in capital sentenc-
ing, there are situations where this critical evidence is not offered.
Most of these involve a situation where (1) the defendant is a "volun-
teer" for the death penalty, (2) the defense makes a strategic or tactical
89. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 681, 940 P.2d 1239, 1247 (1997).
90. Id. at 753-54, 940 P.2d at 1282.
91. Id. Evidence of the impact of execution on Mr. Stenson's family members was not
permitted to be presented to the jury. Id. Pierce County jurors were "unswayed" by mitigation
evidence in the case of Robert Yates, Jr. who was given the death penalty in October 2002 after
he was convicted of aggravated murder in the deaths of two women. Christine Clarridge, Death
Sentence for Yates Elicits Tears, but None for Joy, SEATTLE TIMES, October 4, 2002, available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=yates04m& date20.
92. Id. at 677, 940 P.2d at 1245.
93. See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'g 754 F. Supp. 1490
(W.D. Wash. 1991). The federal courts overturned the Washington Supreme Court's refusal in
Mak to set aside the conviction and the sentencing on direct review. State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d
692, 718 P. 2d. 407, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
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choice not to present mitigation evidence, or (3) defense counsel pro-
vides ineffective assistance of counsel. In all three situations, very lit-
tle-or none-of the available mitigation evidence is actually pre-
sented. Thus, juries are prevented from considering mitigation
evidence when making consequential decisions about the fate of de-
fendants. Issues relating to all three situations have arisen in Wash-
ington since the death penalty was reinstated.97
A. Death Penalty Volunteers
In 1992, faced with Washington's first volunteer since the rein-
troduction of the death penalty, Justice Utter stated that "we are likely
to see many more cases in which capital defendants seek execution. "8
Three of the four men executed by the State of Washington have been
volunteers for the death penalty: Wesley Dodd, Jeremy Sagastegui,
and James Elledge all "request[ed] to be put to death."9 9 All three
men were executed. A fourth man currently on death row, Dwayne
Woods, also volunteered for the death penalty at his trial, but has
since changed his mind. 00
The commitment to the critical nature of mitigation evidence and
its constitutional underpinnings is tested when the defendant acqui-
esces in the State's prosecution by pleading guilty and refusing to put
on evidence that would suggest that leniency is appropriate. The U. S.
Supreme Court has upheld a defendant's right to refuse to present
97. See, e.g., Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 62, 26 P.3d at 271 (volunteer); State v. Benn, 120
Wash. 2d 631, 665-66, 845 P.2d 289, 309-10 (1993), habeas corpus granted and affd, 283 F.3d
1040 (9th Cir. 2002). In Benn, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel relating to investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence both prior
to the prosecution's decision to seek the death penalty, and during the sentencing phase. The
court found there was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Habeas was granted on a separate
issue relating to prosecutorial misconduct. See also State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 889-94,
822 P.2d 177, 211-14 (1991), habeas corpus 184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). In Lord, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court addressed the rules relating to the introduction of mitigation evidence and
the strategic repercussions of introducing such evidence. On appeal regarding a separate issue
related to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the District Court for
reconsideration of habeas corpus.
98. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 34, 838 P.2d 103 (Utter, J., dissenting).
99. See Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 66, 26 P.3d at 274; State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash. 2d 67,
954 P.2d 1311 (1998); Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86. Only Charles Campbell fought his
execution. See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1,691 P.2d 929 (1984).
100. State v. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d 561, 611, 23 P.3d 1046, 1074 (2001). The court noted:
"[W]e have Woods' statement to the jury that there was no mitigating evidence and that he de-
sired that they vote to impose the death penalty." Id. at 611, 23 P.3d at 1074. And Woods as-
serted that "he [was] entitled to have his sentence of death vacated and the case remanded to the
trial court for a new sentencing proceeding." Id. at 608, 23 P.3d at 1072.
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mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase.' Other courts, however,
have considered the public's interest in allowing a defendant to waive
appeals and refrain from challenging the execution, and found that it
is not in the public interest for a defendant to choose death. 112 One
federal court explained:
The criminal defendant should not be permitted to pick and
choose which issues and which avenues he wishes to pursue and
when he wishes to pursue them .... To allow a convicted mur-
derer ... to decide whether the Constitution will be given effect
in a particular case is unseemly and fails to treat our Constitu-
tion with the dignity and respect that it deserves." 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1978 that to allow a
defendant to relinquish his right to appeal would be the same as en-
dorsing the State's assistance in his suicide. 4 In Washington, Justice
Utter echoed this point in Dodd: "To give paramount weight to Mr.
Dodd's desires would, in effect, mean that the State is participating in
Mr. Dodd's suicide."' 10 5
James Elledge's case is the most illuminating on the problems
created for Washington's death penalty statute when a defendant
usurps the criminal sentencing process and volunteers for the death
penalty. Washington's death penalty statute was modified in 1981 to
prevent capital defendants from taking control of the system and using
it for their own purposes.10 6 Nevertheless, James Elledge did exactly
that, stating, "I like to be in control of my own destiny. I don't like
the idea of someone else controlling how I'm going to die or control-
ling whether or not I'm going to live for the next 30, 40, 50 years in
prison."'0 7 At no time did Mr. Elledge introduce any of the mitigation
101. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745
(1983); Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
102. See Christy Chandler, Voluntary Executions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1897, 1909 (1998).
103. Id. (citing Fairchild v. Norris, 869 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Ark. 1993), rev'd, 21 F.3d 799
(8th Cir. 1994)).
104. Id. at 1910 (citing Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 180-81 (Pa. 1978)
(holding that the defendant cannot waive any appeals.)).
105. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 30, 838 P.2d at 101 (citing Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807,
811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
106. See discussion infra Part III. A. 1.
107. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note 3, at 1722. In his desire to use the crimi-
nal process to achieve his execution, James Elledge was no different from Westley Dodd or Jer-
emy Sagastegui. Mr. Dodd chose to die rather "than live his life in a cell." Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d
at 12, 838 P.2d at 91. Justice Utter's dissent in Dodd pointed to Mr. Dodd's statement regarding
previous encounters with the legal system: "I manipulated the system to my advantage." Id. at
38, 838 P.2d at 105 (Utter, J., dissenting). Mr. Sagastegui also had a desire to die and correctly
believed that by killing a child he would get the death penalty. Florangela Davila, Killer's Goal
from the Start: To Engineer His Execution, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, available at
[Vol. 26:241258
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evidence available.1"8 He refused to present evidence of his brutal
childhood, previous mental health issues, the fact that he was a hus-
band, father, and grandfather, or the fact that he had saved a man's
life." 9 By resisting the introduction of this evidence, Mr. Elledge
dominated the sentencing process, and caused Washington's death
penalty statute to fail in its intended operation.
After his arrest, Mr. Elledge confessed to murdering the victim,
Ms. Fitzner."' Just forty days after Ms. Fitzner was murdered, Mr.
Elledge pled guilty, and the special sentencing procedure was initi-
ated.1  Whether Mr. Elledge's attorney or the prosecutor did any in-
vestigation into mitigating circumstances is unclear." 2 It was apparent
that there was absolutely no adversarial process, which virtually guar-
anteed that Mr. Elledge would be deemed eligible for the death pen-
alty."' Without being given a defense-prepared mitigation packet,
which is the usual protocol in capital cases, the prosecutor concluded
that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances, and the death
penalty option was selected. By exercising his right to plead guilty,
Mr. Elledge cemented his eligibility for the death penalty." 4 Thus,
Mr. Elledge successfully controlled this phase of the process, and
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=saga
&date=19981011.
108. In fact, Mr. Elledge's attorney, in closing argument to the sentencing jury, stated that
"[a]lthough we have presented no evidence of mitigation, there is lots of evidence that there is
not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency." Verbatim Report of Proceedings, su-
pra note 3, at 1748.
109. See supra notes 5-8, and accompanying text.
110. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 68-69, 26 P.3d at 276.
111. Id. at 69, 26 P.3d at 276. Ms. Fitzner was murdered on April 18, 1998. Mr. Elledge
was charged with the crime on April 24, 1998. On May 27, 1998, the prosecution filed its notice
to seek the death penalty. At the same hearing, Mr. Elledge pled guilty to aggravated first-degree
murder. Id.
112. At the Washington State Clemency and Pardons hearing, Snohomish County Prose-
cutor Seth Fine indicated that the prosecutor's office looked simply at the statutory mitigating
factors (WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070) only as they related to Ms. Fitzner's murder. See Au-
dio recording: Statement of Seth Fine, Snohomish County Deputy Prosecutor, Testimony before
the Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board, Aug. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.tvw.org/search/eventResults.cfm?StartPage=20&CFID=720332&CFTOKEN=73
193370.
113. See Rice et al., supra note 8, at 11 ( "It became clear that [Mr. Elledge's attorney] had
not even minimally investigated Mr. Elledge's mental state issues or life history."); see also Audio
recording: Statement of Seth Fine, supra note 112 (indicating that at the time the prosecutor's
office made the decision to seek the death penalty, they "did not have a mitigation package from
the defense").
114. See Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 69, 26 P.3d at 276 (Mr. Elledge pled guilty on May 27,
1998.).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 26:241
made himself subject to a jury's determination as to whether or not
Washington should grant his wish to die.115
Subsequently, in the sentencing phase, Mr. Elledge's volunteer
situation further eroded the structure of Washington's death penalty
statute. Not only did Mr. Elledge fail to present mitigation evidence,
but his attorney actually introduced prejudicial evidence above and
beyond the evidence presented by the prosecution.116 During closing
arguments, Mr. Elledge's attorney told the jury that "there was 'lots of
evidence that there is not sufficient mitigating circumstances."'1
Thus, in the absence of any mitigating evidence, and after being told
by the defense that there was no such evidence, the jury did what the
statute mandated. In accordance with his own wishes and actions, the
jury had little choice but to sentence James Elledge to death.11
Another potential roadblock to Mr. Elledge's plan to be executed
by the State of Washington was the Supreme Court. Since there had
not been even a scintilla of mitigation evidence presented at any point
in the case, the court seemingly had no other option but to adhere to
Mr. Elledge's wishes, and uphold his death sentence. 9 Accordingly,
the court stated: "Given the complete absence of any mitigating evi-
dence, and the presence of several severe aggravating circumstances,
115. Mr. Elledge told the jury during his allocution, "[T]here is a very wicked part of me.
And this wicked part of me needs to die." Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note 3, at
1721.
116. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note 3, vol. X, at 1464. Mr. Elledge's attorney
told the court, "[C]onsidering it is our objective that Mr. Elledge be sentenced to death, it is ap-
propriate that from the defense standpoint that we go beyond the mere outline of the prior con-
victions which the State could put on to give some facts." Regarding his client's criminal history,
Mr. Elledge's attorney told the following to the jury:
[w]hat you've heard already in the State's case was that he was convicted of three or
four different felonies .... And you've heard just sort of a bare bones of that. What
I'm going to present you, with my client's permission and cooperation, actually, is
some evidence about what went on and a few other things having to do with his prison
sentence and his parole and so on .... So I think this will give you some additional
information about the life of Jim Elledge which will help you make your decision and
answer the question about mitigating circumstances.
Id., vol. XII, at 1715. Mr. Elledge's attorney then informed the jury that in addition to the lim-
ited information the State had presented, Mr. Elledge had escaped from prison in New Mexico,
broken his parole several times, been charged with attempted burglary, and that he had killed the
woman in 1974 with a ball-peen hammer. Id. at 1717-19.
117. Rice et al., supra note 8, at 13 (quoting Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 62, 26 P.3d at 271;
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note 3, at 1748). This statement was made despite there
being actual, solid mitigating evidence.
118. See Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note 3, at 1760.
119. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 70, 26 P.3d at 276 ("[B]oth Elledge and the State advocate
affirmance of Elledge's death sentence."); see id. at 79, 26 P.3d at 281 ("Given the complete ab-
sence of any mitigating evidence ... we hold that the jury was justified in its determination that
leniency was not merited."); but see discussion supra, note 52.
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we hold that the jury was justified in its determination that leniency
was not merited."' 20
The waiver of mitigating circumstances by a defendant such as
Mr. Elledge may make the system's decision easier. For example, if a
defendant waives all appeals, the cost savings to the state can be sub-
stantial. 12' Litigation costs are reduced, as well as the expense of keep-
ing an inmate on death row. 122 If a defendant is allowed to waive all
appeals, society's interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal
justice system and upholding the law against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment is infringed. In appellate waiver situations, the safeguard
against sentencing the innocent to death is rendered useless because
guilt is no longer the question. If the defendant is guilty, the question
of whether the circumstances of the offense together with the character
of the offender merit death becomes irrelevant. 23 In fact, there is no
question to decide whatsoever.
The same can be said if a defendant opts not to present any miti-
gation evidence. In this scenario, if a defendant wants to die, the
prosecutor presents aggravating circumstances to merit the death pen-
alty, and the defendant makes no counterargument in favor of life.
Simply put, death is the inevitable result. No decision of death should
be an easy one. The qualitative difference between death and any
other sentence creates a "corresponding difference in the need for reli-
ability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment
in a specific case. ' 124 Because of the premium placed on reliability in
120. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 79, 26 P.3d at 281.
121. See Death Penalty Information Center, Costs of the Death Penalty, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs2.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2002)
122. Id. For example, it costs California more than $200,000 a year to keep one inmate on
death row. In Okanogan County, Washington, Commissioners delayed pay raises for all 350 of
its employees due to death penalty trial costs, eventually only raising their pay by 2 percent,
which was the smallest increase in years. They also were forced to order a halt on all nonemer-
gency travel, put a hold on updating computers and county vehicles, and they opted not to re-
place two of the four public health nurses because the death penalty cases were draining so much
of their budget. Id. In 1999 alone, Washington State budgeted $346,000 to seek Mitchel Rupe's
death sentence for the third time, and Thurston County budgeted almost $700,000 for one sen-
tencing hearing. Id. Pierce County, which has sent the most persons to death row in Washing-
ton, spent $1.3 million in death penalty cases in 1999. See Lise Olsen, Unstable Marshall Is
Fighting for his Life-Today, SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 7, 2001, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/33914_marshall07.shtml. Estimates are that King County
could spend more than $10 million to try Gary Ridgeway in March 2004 for four of the so-called
Green River homicides. Margaret Taus, Green River Case's Soaring Cost Stirs Debate Over Pri-
orities, SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 2002, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local /97938-greenriver30.shtml.
123. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 ("We have long recognized that 'for the determination of
sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the
offence together with the character and propensities of the offender.')
124. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
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this context, the factfinder's ability to consider mitigating evidence is a
cornerstone of a legitimate death penalty scheme.
In short, by volunteering for the death penalty, James Elledge hi-
jacked Washington's death penalty scheme and caused it to fail in its
operation. He declined to present mitigating evidence, even though it
existed. Since there was no mitigation presented prior to the decision
to seek the death penalty and he pled guilty to aggravated first-degree
murder, Mr. Elledge was found to be eligible for the death penalty.
At the sentencing phase, not only was no mitigation introduced, Mr.
Elledge's attorney informed the jury that there was no such evidence.
Thus, Mr. Elledge intentionally forced the jury to make an unreliable
and nonindividualized decision regarding his sentence. Finally, the
mandatory review of Mr. Elledge's sentence was meaningless since he
had prevented the introduction of mitigating evidence in all of the
previous steps in the process.
The reality is that death penalty volunteers create numerous
problems that have been minimized for the most part by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court apart from Justice Utter's aforementioned pre-
scient statements. The negative ramifications include the include: (1)
frustrating the intent of the legislature; (2) creating undesirable social
policy; (3) circumventing the function of the jury; (4) foreclosing op-
tions when volunteers change their minds; and (5) limiting the choices
of defense counsel.
1. Frustrating the Intent of the Legislature
Prior to 1981, capital defendants in Washington could strategi-
cally control the process and prevent themselves from being subject to
the death penalty.12 By pleading guilty, a capital defendant could
avoid even the consideration of the death penalty.'26 The Washington
legislature was working to correct this apparent statutory lapse when
the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Frampton127 that the
state's death penalty statute was unconstitutional. 128 The death pen-
alty statute signed into law in May 1981 expressed the legislature's de-
sire to have a strong death penalty statute that prevented capital de-
fendants from running roughshod over the process for their own
purposes. 129
125. State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 2d 1, 8,614 P.2d 164, 167 (1980).
126. Id.
127. 95 Wash. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981).
128. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 497, 627 P.2d at 936.
129. See House Journal, 47th Leg. Sess. 398 (Wash. 1981); see also Martin, 94 Wash. 2d 1,
614 P.2d 164 (1980); Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981).
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The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Martin, held that
the death penalty statute did not prevent a defendant from exercising
the right to plead guilty.13° In accordance with Criminal Rule 4.2(a), a
defendant could choose to plead guilty "unhampered by a prosecuting
attorney's opinions or desires."' 31 In addition, the court determined
that when a defendant unconditionally pleads guilty to first-degree
murder, the maximum penalty he or she could face was life imprison-
ment.'32 The court found that no part of the statute provides for a
special sentencing proceeding when a defendant pleads guilty to first-
degree murder.'33 According to the majority, "Clearly the legislature
did not anticipate the possibility that an accused might plead guilty to
a charge of first-degree murder." '134 Thus, a defendant could choose to
avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty, despite the prosecution's
desire to seek consideration of the death penalty.
In State v. Frampton, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Martin holding that, under the state's scheme at the time, "a de-
fendant who pleads guilty cannot be subjected to [the death pen-
alty]."' 35 In addition, the court found that "[t]he Washington statutes
for the imposition of the death penalty needlessly chill a defendant's
constitutional rights to plead not guilty and demand a jury trial." '36
Under the statute, a defendant's choice was either to plead guilty,
guaranteeing that the death penalty would not be imposed but giving
up the right to a trial, or to exercise his constitutional right to a trial by
pleading not guilty, and risk a capital sentence. Accordingly, the
state's procedure for imposing the death penalty violated the mandate
set forth in United States v. Jackson,137 wherein the United States Su-
preme Court held that "if the severity of the punishment is dependent
upon the way guilt is determined ... [then] this imposes an impermis-
sible burden on the exercise of constitutional rights."'13  The Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that Washington's death penalty scheme
was unconstitutional. 139
130. Martin, 94 Wash. 2d at 6, 614 P.2d at 166.
131. Id. at 5-6, 614 P.2d at 166. CrR 4.2(a) states that "[a] defendant may plead not
guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty." Martin, 94 Wash. 2d at 4, 614 P.2d at 166.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 8, 614 P.2d at 167.
134. Id.
135. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 480, 627 P.2d at 927.
136. Id. at 479, 627 P.2d at 927.
137. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
138. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 480, 627 P.2d at 927.
139. Id.
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The Washington legislature responded to the Supreme Court's
decisions by reworking the state's death penalty scheme.14 The proc-
ess had begun prior to the Frampton decision as a response both to
Martin and the possibility that the Court would find the older statute
unconstitutional.' The entire legislative process was complete, and
the new statute was signed into law, less than a month after the
Frampton court declared the old scheme unconstitutional.142
The purpose of the new death penalty statute was "to provide
this state with the strongest, most constitutionally sound death penalty
that can be produced." ' The very first section of the new statute
made clear that a rule promulgated by the Washington Supreme
Court could not "supersede or alter any of the provisions" of the chap-
ter.1 44 Thus, the Supreme Court was prohibited from using its court
rules to defeat the intentions of the legislature and the operation of the
statute. 145
In addition, when a defendant is adjudicated guilty, regardless of
whether that adjudication was by a jury verdict, guilty plea, or bench
trial, "a special sentencing proceeding shall be held."' 46 The legisla-
ture went so far as to make a special sentencing proceeding required if
"unforeseen circumstances make it impracticable to reconvene the
same jury to hear" the proceeding. 47 The revised statute also de-
scribes the process for convening a special sentencing proceeding jury
in the event that there was not an original trial jury to reconvene for
the sentencing.'48 Indeed, the legislature expressly addressed the Mar-
tin holding, stating that "[n]o sort of plea, admission, or agreement
may abrogate the requirement that a special sentencing proceeding be
held.'1 49 This language, combined with the bar on court rules super-
seding the statute, ensured that a capital defendant would not be able
140. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.010-900 (2002); David B. Erickson, Refinement of
Washington's Death Penalty Act, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 715, 716 (1982).
141. The new statute was presented in the House of Representatives on March 4, 1981,
during the first session. House Journal, 47th Leg. Sess. 398 (Wash. 1981). Frampton was de-
cided over a month later on April 16, 1981. In addition, the house passed the bill on March 18,
1981 (House Journal at 454) and the senate passed the bill just ten days after the court's decision.
Senate Journal, 47th Leg. Sess. 2163 (Wash. 1981).
142. Erickson, supra note 140, at 715-16.
143. House Journal, 47th Leg. Sess. 398 (Wash. 1981) (statement of Rep. Schmidt, who
was the sponsor of the new statute, on March 11, 1981).
144. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.010 (2002).
145. Leonie G. Hellwig, Comment, The Death Penalty in Washington: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 57 WASH. L. REV. 525, 548 (1982).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.050(1).
147. Id. § 10.95.050(3).
148. Id. § 10.95.050(4).
149. Id. § 10.95.050(1).
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to take control of the system by pleading guilty to avoid the death
penalty.
Prior to Frampton, Washington's death penalty scheme enabled a
defendant charged with a capital offense to govern the process and
prevent the State from pursuing a death sentence."' The defendant
could plead guilty to first-degree murder, against the desires of the
prosecution, and avoid even the possibility of a death sentence since
the statutes had no provision to allow for its consideration.'51 The leg-
islature was responding both to this problem and to the possibility
that the court would find the state's death penalty statute unconstitu-
tional when Frampton was decided.' 52 Thus, the legislature enacted a
statute that they considered to be unassailable to prevent a defendant
from dictating his or her sentencing determination. 1a
But now the state legislature's intention to deny capital defen-
dants the absolute right to determine their own sentences is being nul-
lified yet again. Rather than to avoid the death penalty, capital defen-
dants under the current statute are directing the process to ensure that
they will face the death penalty.'54 Indeed, seventy-five percent of
those executed in Washington since reinstatement of the death penalty
post-Frampton have commandeered the system to their own ends by
refusing to provide any mitigating circumstances at their special sen-
tencing proceedings."'
These defendants made the choice to not present any mitigating
evidence in order to make certain that they were executed. 56 Using
the death penalty statute in this manner is not in accordance with the
United States Supreme Court's decisions requiring that "the sentenc-
ing authority is given adequate information and guidance. ' '157
When a defendant chooses to not present mitigating evidence,
that defendant is able to frustrate not only the express guidance of the
U.S. Supreme Court, but also the intent and operation of Washing-
ton's death penalty statute.55 Refusing to present mitigating evidence
creates a per se preclusion of that evidence from the sentencing author-
150. See Martin, 94 Wash. 2d at 2, 614 P.2d at 165.
151. Id. at 3, 614 P.2d at 165.
152. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 75, 26 P.3d at 279.
155. See Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 77, 26 P.3d at 280; Sagastegui, 135 Wash. 2d at 89, 954
P.2d at 1319; Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 25, 838 P.2d at 98; see also supra notes 99-100.
156. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
157. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
158. See supra Parts III, IV, V.
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ity."' The jury is prevented from receiving adequate information on
which to make a decision about whether to impose the death penalty
or not. If jurors were to receive the mitigating evidence, they would
not be prevented from finding that a death sentence is warranted. 6°
The inclusion of the mitigating evidence simply gives the jury the in-
formation required to make a reliable, individualized sentence deter-
mination.' 6'
The legislature clearly vested control of the scheme with the
prosecutors, jurors, and judges. These are the actors who are respon-
sible to ensure that Washington's death penalty is not inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious or unreliable and nonindividualized manner.
Domination of the process by defendants who prevent presentation of
mitigating evidence is not what the legislature intended.
2. Creating Undesirable Social Policy
Defendants who choose not to defend themselves against death,
or who ask for death as a penalty because they openly have a desire to
die, are committing suicide. These volunteers for execution violate
the intrinsic statewide and federal policy against suicide. In Washing-
ton, this policy is evidenced by pertinent statutory language that states
nothing is to be construed as to "condone, authorize, or approve
mercy killing or physician-assisted suicide, or to permit any affirma-
tive or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the
natural process of dying."'162 The law also provides: "Promoting a sui-
cide attempt is a class C felony." '163
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court of the United
States underscored this policy against suicide by upholding the Wash-
ington statute that prohibits "promoting a suicide attempt" against a
challenge by terminally ill individuals and their physicians.'64 An
analysis of the case opinion confirms that suicide and assisted suicide,
in any form, are inherently against public policy. 6
159. This is particularly true in light of the Washington Supreme Court's rulings refusing
to "adopt a position whereby 'special counsel' would be appointed to investigate and present
mitigating evidence." Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d at 76, 26 P.3d at 280 (quoting Sagastegui, 135
Wash. 2d at 87, 954 P.2d at 1311).
160. See, e.g., Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 759-60, 940 P.2d at 1285.
161. E.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
162. WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.122.100 (2002).
163. Id. § 9A.36.060(2).
164. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
165. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-11. The Court declared that "[i]ndeed, opposition to and
condemnation of suicide-and therefore, of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring
themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages." Id. at 711. The Court further ac-
knowledged that "[a]ttitudes toward suicide itself have changed ... but our laws have consis-
tently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical tech-
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According to the Glucksberg Court, there are many reasons to
support a public policy against suicide. First, the people who try to
commit suicide, whether terminally ill or not, "often suffer from de-
pression or other mental disorders." '166 By examining relevant re-
search, the Court concluded that a number of people who receive
treatment for their pain and depression withdraw their desire to die.'67
Accordingly, research indicated that legal, physician-assisted suicide
may
make it more difficult for the state to protect depressed or men-
tally ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain,
from suicidal impulses. The state also has an interest in protect-
ing the integrity and ethics of the medical profession ... the
American Medical Association, like many other medical and
physicians' groups, has concluded that 'physician-assisted sui-
cide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as
healer.' 168
The Glucksberg Court found that physician-assisted suicide could"undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship
by blurring the time-honored line between healing and harming."169
To ask a physician to kill a patient would be unfair, and inconsistent
with the requirement that the doctor medically do what is best for the
patient.
nology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decision
making, we have not retreated from this prohibition." Id. at 719.
166. Id. at 730 (See New York Task Force 13-22, 126-128 (more than 95% of those who
commit suicide had a major psychiatric illness at the time of death; among the terminally ill, un-
controlled pain is a "risk factor" because it contributes to depression); Physician-Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady to the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (Comm.
Print 1996); cf. Back, Wallace, Starks, & Pearlman, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
Washington State, 275 JAMA 919, 924 (1996) ("[Ilntolerable physical symptoms are not the rea-
son most patients request physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.").).
167. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730 (citing HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH:
DOCTORS, PATIENT'S AND THE DUTCH CURE 24-25 (1997) ("suicidal, terminally ill patients'usually respond well to treatment for depressive illness and pain medication and are then grate-
ful to be alive."'); New York Task Force 177-78.)
168. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF
ETHICS § 2.211 (1994); see Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life,
267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) ("The societal risks of involving physicians in medical interven-
tions to cause patients' deaths is too great."); New York Task Force 103-09 (discussing physi-
cians' views.))
169. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730; Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.,
355-56 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) ("The patient's trust in the doctor's whole-
hearted devotion to his best interests will be hard to sustain.")
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The Glucksberg Court also recognized that the state has an inter-
est in "protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly
and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.""17  The
fear is that if physician-assisted suicide were permitted, "many might
resort to it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of
end-of-life health care costs." 171
This same analysis is applicable to death penalty volunteers. In
the case of Westley Allan Dodd, Justice Utter noted the following in
his dissent:
It is common for those on death row to express a will to stop
their appeals and proceed with execution. Most change their
minds and agree to continue the appeals process. Given the
physical and psychological pressures felt by those on death row,
the lure of ceasing to resist the death penalty may be as great for
the innocent as for the guilty.172
Death penalty volunteers are often mentally unstable, if not
clinically mentally ill. Consequently, there is now a typical profile of
volunteers: they have a record of some mental illness, were abused as
children, and have already served time in jail. 73 A prosecutor in Flor-
ida, where the volunteer phenomenon has also been a problem, said,
"I think that if the people who ask for death were given psychological
exams, they would likely be diagnosed as severely depressed."' 74
Many volunteers for execution suffer depression and mental dis-
orders stemming not only from the psychological effects of the crime
they committed, but also from the living conditions that come with
their sentences. 7  Death row inmates are purposely deprived of free-
doms that other citizens enjoy and these losses contribute to their
mental and physical states. Those awaiting execution are discon-
nected from the rest of the prison populace, refused admission to re-
habilitative curriculums, denied regular exercise and physical activity,
and secluded in their cells for exceptionally long periods. 176
170. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
171. Id. at 732.
172. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 34-35, 838 P.2d at 103 (Utter, J., dissenting) (citing Richard
C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 799, 800 (1990), and G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Volun-
tariness and the Propriety of Third-Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 869
(1983)).
173. Reuters, The Death Penalty as a Means of Assisted Suicide (Dec. 14, 2000), at
http://www.againstdp.org/assistedsuicide.html.
174. Id.
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Psychiatric research suggests that "long-term isolation causes
humans to suffer anxiety, confusion, a sense of unreality, and depres-
sion."' 77  One Harvard psychiatrist has concluded that many death
row inmates "already feel so spiritually dead that they long for physi-
cal death as well ... in some cases, [execution] gratifies the suicidal
wishes of those who are prone to committing murders in the first
place."' 78 Another commentator found that when
barren conditions are combined with the psychological stress
that results from 'being forced to live with the spasmodic cer-
tainty and uncertainty of being sentenced to die,' it is not sur-
prising that many prisoners find existence on death row intoler-
able. Indeed, several inmates have stated that these conditions
gave rise to their preference for the death penalty. 79
This mental instability that is common in defendants who have
committed violent crimes and who are facing their own death is the
same type of mental instability that could be found in any person con-
sidering suicide. Thus, the state policy that protects vulnerable people
from being able to make a choice of suicide should apply to all people,
criminals and noncriminals alike. 180
Mental illness and depression are not the only reason why defen-
dants become volunteers for the death penalty. Other reasons include"physical illness, remorse, bravado, religious belief ... pessimism
about appeal prospects, a quest for notoriety, or simply ... a way for
the prisoner to gain a semblance of control over a situation in which
they are otherwise helpless." ''  These characteristics, like depression
and mental instability, are also distinctive in suicidal noncriminals,
who, because of state policy, are protected by the State.
Once on death row, the inmate, like any other prisoner, is pro-
tected to the fullest extent by the state. States will keep suicidal death
row inmates alive up until even hours before their execution so that
they will be available for their execution, because that is the state pol-
icy-no suicide. In Texas, David Martin Long attempted suicide by
177. Reuters, Harsh Prisons Prompt Inmates to Opt for Execution (Jan. 8, 2001), at
http://www.againstdp.org/optfor.html. See also Katherine van Wormer & Chuk Odiah, The
Psychology of Suicide-Murder and the Death Penalty, paper presented at the World Conference on
Violence and the Future of Society, Dublin, Ireland (August 20-23, 1997), at
http://www.angelfire.com/fl3/starke/psychology.html.
178. Reuters, Death Penalty, supra note 173 (citing to JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: OUR
DEADLY EPIDEMIC AND ITS CAUSES (1996)).
179. White, supranote 175, at 871.
180. See generally van Wormer & Odiah, supra note 177.
181. Amnesty International, The Illusion of Control: "Consensual" Executions... and the
Brutalizing Futility of Capital Punishment 5, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/
reports/amr510532001.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
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drug overdose before his execution date.12  The State flew him to a
hospital in Huntsville accompanied by a full medical team, and in-
jected him with a charcoal solution to "detoxify" his body, only to in-
ject him with a lethal dose of poison a few hours later."l 3
Suicide on death row in Washington has occurred once in the cell
and three times in the death chamber. 8 4 It is against state policy to
allow death row inmates to commit suicide, or even die a natural
death.8 5 To uphold a policy of suicide prevention in the cell and not
in the death chamber is inconsistent. Whether the inmate himself or a
doctor administers death should not be distinguished in a case where
the accused has purposefully chosen the penalty.
The situation involving death row volunteers may be also analo-
gous to the so-called suicide-by-police or suicide-by-cop phenomenon
that has become familiar to law enforcement officers as a situation
where individuals deliberately try to get the police to kill them.8 6
This usually involves a premeditated plan by persons who want to die
but cannot quite end their own lives.8 7 These individuals commit a
crime, and then deliberately do something that will prompt a police
officer to shoot at them, such as taking hostages, brandishing weapons,
threatening the police officer, or making sudden moves.'
These suicide-by-cop strategies have been carried out all over the
country and are now more easily recognized by police. The usual ap-
proach among law enforcement agencies is to take the necessary steps
to prevent the suicide-by-cop killings in compliance with the public
policy denouncing suicide:
[P]olice are being trained today to exercise restraint by learning
to recognize the characteristics that may help them avoid engag-
182. Id. at 12.
183. Id.
184. See generally Washington Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, at
http://www.abolishdeathpenalty.org/wcadp-resources.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002).
185. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 121. When Mitchell Rupe was on
death row, he was dying of liver disease. The State made every effort it could to keep him
healthy just so that it could execute him. Id. His sentence has since been commuted to life
without parole. Washington Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Spring Newsletter 2000,
available at http://www.abolishdeathpenalty.org/newsletters/spring00.pdf (last visited Dec. 31,
2002).
186. Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, Suicide By Police in Section 1983 Suits: Rele-
vance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 555 (2000). In the academic literature, the
term characterizes a situation where "[i]ndividuals, bent on self-destruction, engage in life-
threatening and criminal behavior in order to force the police to kill them." Id. (citing Vernon J.
Geberth, Suicide-by-Cop: Inviting Death from the Hands of a Police Officer, LAW & ORDER 105
(July 1993)).
187. van Wormer & Odiah, supra note 177.
188. Id.
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ing people in suicidal show-downs .... [Characteristics in-
clude] suicidal motivation ... [they] may seem distressed or,
contrarily, act as if they do not care whether or not the officers
kill them."8 9
This same ideology is inherent in many criminals' plans to vol-
unteer for execution. There are cases among the volunteers where
criminals have killed in order to be killed. This was true in Washing-
ton with triple-murderer Jeremy Sagastegui. In an interview before
his death, Sagastegui explicitly said, "[I]f the State wouldn't have had
the death penalty, those people would still be alive."' 90 Thomas Akers
of Virginia walked around wearing an electric chair pendant around
his neck.' He promised his family that one day he would be executed
by the State.'92 His plan worked out perfectly: one day he beat a man
to death, and once apprehended, he demanded the death penalty for it.
He was executed on March 1, 2001.113 If his "plan" had involved be-
ing shot by a police officer rather than execution in a death chamber,
the State would have put a stop to it.
The idea that some volunteers kill to be killed is clinically called"suicide murder," and this occurs when suicide "will not be viewed
not as the consequence of the murder, but rather, as its cause."194 The
psychoanalytical literature has "long proposed a link betweein homi-
cidal and suicidal tendencies. '"19' The murder-suicide connection, ac-
cording to this conceptualization, then becomes the "expression of an
extended suicide."' 96 Murder-suicide is another pathway to assisted
suicide, only it is a newfound pathway; it is not physician-assisted, or
189. Id.
190. Amnesty International, supra note 181, at 8. The issue of Sagastegui's mental compe-




194. van Wormer & Odiah, supra note 177.
195. Id. Professor van Wormer gives the example of Menninger, who argued, "[S]uicide
involves the wish to kill, to be killed, and to die. Those prone to suicide... are immature indi-
viduals fixated at early stages of development." Id. (citing generally KARL A. MENNINGER,
MAN AGAINST HIMSELF (1938)). She also references the writings of Palermo, who argued the
following:
It is plausible to assume that the murderer, who is usually depressed and paranoid,
harbors a primary suicidal thought. Such a man does not feel, therefore, that he is
killing an autonomous entity but, rather, an extension of himself. The murder-
suicide, according to this conceptualization, then becomes the expression of an ex-
tended suicide.
Id. (citing G.B. Palermo, Murder-Suicide-An Extended Suicide, INT'L J. OF OFFENDER
THERAPY AND COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 38 (3), 205, 216 (1994)).
196. Id. (citing G.B. Palermo, Murder-Suicide-An Extended Suicide, INT'L J. OF
OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 38 (3), 205, 215 (1994))
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cop-assisted, but it is state penalty-assisted. This new pathway, like
the others, is profoundly against public policy.
It is increasingly apparent that there are additional reasons why
volunteers may decide to choose death before their crimes are even
committed: bravado and martyrdom. In this era of terrorist attacks,
this should be an area of growing concern. This issue was a factor in
the execution of Timothy McVeigh. Many feared that McVeigh
dropped his appeals so that he would appear to be a "Martyr fig-
ure. "197
A former National Security Council member recently wrote that
there is a risk that "executing people who commit acts of political vio-
lence may incite further violence." '98 Amnesty International has also
expressed a concern that "executions for politically motivated crimes
may result in greater publicity for acts of terror, thus drawing in-
creased public attention to the perpetrators' political agenda. Such
executions may also create martyrs whose memory becomes a rallying
point ... "199
This "martyrdom" phenomenon could present a chilling future
for the capital punishment system in the United States as more and
more terrorists are captured and brought before the courts. If all the
terrorists are like the suicide bombers of September 11, there is a good
chance they will not fight death. If they were then put to death, their
executions would mean a memorable legacy among their co-
conspirators for having performed acts of courage and made a mockery
of the United States criminal justice system. °0
If a prisoner asks to be executed and the State complies with that
request, "in reality, the State is taking to refined, calculated heights
what it seeks to condemn-the deliberate taking of human life. 21
Moreover, if "volunteers" are continually allowed to sentence them-
selves, the deterrence element of capital punishment will be com-
197. Amnesty International, supra note 181, at 7.
198. Id. (comments of Jessica Stem).
199. Id.
200. For example, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for the bombing of the United States Embassy in Kenya because ten of the twelve jurors
feared that sentencing him to death would only glorify his cause and make him a martyr. CBS
News, No Martyrdom for Embassy Bomber, June 13, 2001, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/05/30/national/main293880.shtml. See also Julian
Borger, Death Row Diaries Reveal McVeigh's Goal of Martyrdom, THE GUARDIAN, June 9, 2001,
at 22. Diaries of death row inmates associated with Timothy McVeigh revealed that McVeigh
took measures such as starving himself so that his postmortem pictures would reveal a man re-
sembling a "concentration camp victim." Id.
201. Amnesty International, supra note 181, at 18.
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pletely invalidated. Many defendants at one time say that they would
rather choose death than life imprisonment. 202 This indicates that
potential murderers as a group do not view the death penalty in
the same way as the general populace .... If it is assumed that
potential murderers take into account possible punishments be-
fore deciding whether to commit murder, for them a system of
punishment that includes the death penalty will be a less effec-
tive deterrent than one that does not.2 3
The current capital punishment system in the State of Washing-
ton is a perfect example of the fallacy of deterrence. The fact that
three of the four men executed by Washington State were volunteers
makes it clear that the system needs modification. Obviously, crimi-
nals in Washington do not view the death penalty as deterrence, or
even a punishment, for that matter. They choose it as if it is their sav-
ing grace, or path to freedom-to do the one thing they could never do
themselves.
One commentator argues that
[sltate interests in the context of volunteering include an interest
in preventing suicide; an interest in upholding the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ... ; an interest in ensur-
ing that innocent persons not be executed; an interest in ensur-
ing the validity of the conviction and sentence through the ap-
pellate process; and an interest in not allowing inmates to choose
their own sentencing. 204
If prisoners are allowed to premeditate their own deaths through
that system, it is not working properly. Physician-assisted suicide,
suicide in a jail cell, and suicide-by-cop should not be distinguishable
from suicide by the death penalty. They are all forms of suicide or as-
sisted suicide that are against the law and against public policy. A
person's suicidal premeditated strategy to kill in order to be killed
through capital punishment does not give carte blanche to the State to
automatically invoke the death penalty. Furthermore, it is not in the
state's interest to yield to the suicidal missions of a murderer or terror-
ist. No assisted suicide is permitted under Washington law; death
penalty volunteers should not receive any more rights than what the
law provides in this respect.
202. White, supra note 175, at 876-77.
203. Id.
204. C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death
Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 851 (2000).
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The state interest, or fear, that suicidal individuals will make
clouded choices as a result of mental incapacity is a reality, not only in
the medical field but also in the legal field. A state interest that con-
demns suicide should be consistent throughout the law, no matter who
the suicidal party is. To indicate otherwise would give a right to
deadly criminals that no other innocent or guilty person has, no right
that any terminally ill, elderly, healthy, or vulnerable person has.
Steps must be taken to ensure that the criminals who are put to death
are the ones who have committed the harshest crimes and who deserve
to die, not those who reserve the right to die because this right does
not exist in our state or in our country.
3. Circumventing the Function of the Jury
Where the defendant refuses to allow mitigating evidence to be
presented during the sentencing phase of the trial, the function of the
jury is circumvented. One observer has noted the following with re-
gard to the jury's right to hear mitigating evidence:
Social histories in this context, then, are not excuses, they are
explanations. An explanation does not necessarily dictate an
outcome, not even a penalty trial outcome. Some explanations
lead to life verdicts, and some do not. But no jury can render
justice in the absence of an explanation. 205
American jurisprudence involving capital punishment and its
constitutional foundation in the Eighth Amendment emphasizes that
"death is different. '20 6  The United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that because "there is a qualitative difference between
death and any other permissible form of punishment, there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. "207 Measures
such as the presentation of mitigation evidence are vital functions in a
death penalty case because they are designed to ensure reliability if
death is determined to be the appropriate punishment.0 8
Other constitutional criminal protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights explicitly refer to the rights of a "person" or of "the accused";
205. Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547,560-61 (1995).
206. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.VIII.
207. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
208. Cf. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1976).
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however, the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions seem crafted to pro-
tect individual rights and to safeguard the public interest as well.2 °9
One scholar has identified that "[t]he societal interest at stake is
respect for the criminal justice system and a society which only im-
poses such a severe penalty as death under controlled, fair circum-
stances. '211 She further advises that "[p]ermitting a defendant to
waive or forego the presentation of mitigating evidence defeats the
public's interest inherent in the eighth amendment. 21'
There is a fundamental societal interest involved in the presenta-
tion of both aggravating and mitigating evidence. This balanced pres-
entation helps to ensure that the appropriate punishment is being
used, protects a defendant's interest against experiencing cruel and
unusual punishment, and guards against a possibility that a state will
shock the community's conscience or undermine the integrity of our
criminal justice system. 12 If a defendant is allowed to forego the pres-
entation of mitigating evidence for purposes of self-interest, the ques-
tion then must be: what happens to society's interest and the jury's
critical role in safeguarding that interest?
Denying the jury the opportunity to consider substantial mitiga-
tion evidence is fundamentally unfair to the jury. These twelve citi-
zens are asked to represent the conscience of society, and a heavy bur-
den is placed on them to weigh the evidence and decide on the life or
death of another person.2 3  As one prosecutor put it, they are the"people we call upon to make the most horrendous decision we can ask
anyone to make about another human being. ' 214 Jurors look to the
fairness of the process to assuage their doubts and ease the weight of
their decision. If a defendant stops the presentation of mitigation, the
jury never hears the whole story, and the fairness necessary for them
to alleviate their doubts is consequently taken away.
If there are no mitigating circumstances brought forth to merit
leniency for a criminal defendant, the usual sentence will be death, as
opposed to life imprisonment. Without any other evidence, the State
can easily prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the criminal defen-
dant is among the most terrible of criminals, and that the crime com-
209. The Fifth Amendment uses the term "person," and the Sixth Amendment focuses on
"the accused." U.S. CONST. amend.V and amend.VI.
210. Carter, supra note 35, at 128.
211. Id.at 127-28.
212. See generally Whitmore, 495 U.S. 149.
213. Political science professor Jeffrey Abramson has stated: "Deliberating death, then, is
the premier contemporary example where old invocations of the jury as the conscience of the
community live on." JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY 212 (1994).
214. Denn & Fisher, supra note 1 (statement of Snohomish County Deputy Prosecutor
John Adcock).
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mitted was a horrendous evil. This makes it acceptable for the jury to
then invoke the ultimate punishment. The most important function
of a jury is to consider all the important factors prior to choosing an
appropriate penalty. This burden upon the jury is why the presenta-
tion of mitigating evidence is such a fundamental part of maintaining
justice-it ensures that the death penalty is not imposed in an arbi-
trary manner.21  Although the introduction of this evidence does not
guarantee a sentence of life rather than death, it does provide the nec-
essary statutory and constitutional equilibrium in the sentencing proc-
ess.
4. Foreclosing Options When Volunteers Change Their Minds
In Dodd, Justice Utter hypothesized that a "serious dilemma"
would arise when a capital defendant "changes his or her mind about
desiring the death penalty." '216 He suggested that "[e]lither we must
conclude that the defendant is stuck with an unfavorable trial record,
or require a new trial. ' 217 Recently, in State v. Woods, Washington's
Supreme Court faced the precise dilemma predicted by Justice Utter
in Dodd.21 '8 The court decided that the former option was more ap-propriate for Washington. 21 '9 This conclusion, however, runs contrary
to the constitutional mandate of the United States Supreme Court, to
the intent of the Washington legislature, and to the effective operation
of Washington's death penalty statute.22°
The majority determined that at trial, "Woods made a voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing choice not to present mitigating evidence.'221
The court found that the waiver of the right to present mitigating evi-
dence should be evaluated in a manner similar to the waiver of the
right to testify on one's own behalf.222 Accordingly, "the judge may
assume a knowing waiver of the right from the defendant's con-
duct. ' 223  Defense counsel retains "[t]he responsibility for informing
the defendant of this right [to present mitigation] and discussing the
merits and demerits of the decision ....224
215. See Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
216. State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 43, 838 P.2d 86,107 (Utter, J., dissenting).
217. Id. Utter continued, "The first option seems unfair; the second, too costly. Requiring
presentation of mitigating evidence at the outset would be preferable." Id.
218. State v. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d 561, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001).
219. Id. at 615, 23 P.3d at 1076.
220. See discussion supra Parts III, IV, V.
221. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d at 609, 23 P.3d at 1073.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting State v. Thomas, 128 Wash. 2d 553, 559, 910 P.2d 475, 479 (1996)).
224. Id. Interestingly, the court found that defense counsel was able to accomplish this
"discussion" and Mr. Woods was able to come to a competent decision over the weekend follow-
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The Supreme Court determined that trial courts are not required
to meet any other standard in assessing a waiver of the presentation of
mitigation evidence.225 In dicta, the majority did acknowledge that"other states have adopted specific procedures that must be followed
by a trial court when a defendant desires to forgo the presentation of
mitigating evidence." 226 The court found that common to these pro-
cedures were two requirements: "[T]he trial court must: (1) apprise
the defendant of what mitigation evidence is and its role in the capital
sentencing process, and (2) inquire whether the defendant desires to
waive the right to present such evidence. , 227
The court concluded that the Woods trial judge met this non-
mandatory standard by first conducting a brief colloquy with Mr.
Woods. 228 The court also determined that Mr. Woods "was informed
of what mitigation evidence is and what its role is in the capital sen-
tencing process. ' 221 Second, the trial court was informed by Mr.
Woods' attorney, during arguments for his motion for a continuance
after the guilty verdict, that Mr. Woods "wishe[d], at least as far as
expressed most recently to me, that we not put on any mitigation at
all."' 230  In addition, the court surmised that the very fact that Mr.
ing his conviction. Id. at 604-06, 23 P.3d at 1070-72. Defense counsel had asked for, and had
been denied, a week's continuance to have Mr. Woods' competence evaluated after the guilty
verdict was returned and Mr. Woods stated his intent to preclude presentation of mitigation evi-
dence. Id.
225. Woods, 143 Wash. 2dat611, 23P.3dat 1074.
226. Id. at 610, 23 P.3d at 1073.
227. Id. In forming this "standard," the court looked to Oklahoma (Fitzgerald v. State, 972
P.2d 1157 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)), Ohio (State v. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 1231 (1999)), and
Florida (Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186 (Fla.1997). Justice Sanders, in dissent, criticized the
majority's test, stating that "[t]he majority's nonmandatory two-part test is a far cry from the
procedures employed in the very cases it cites for support." Id. at 632, 23 P.3d 1084 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
228. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d at 611, 23 P.3d at 1074.
229. Id. at 610, 23 P.3d at 1073-74. The extent of the trial court's questioning found rele-
vant by the supreme court was:
THE COURT: ... Do you understand that in the death penalty sentencing phase,
this next phase we're talking about, you have a right to make an unsworn statement to
the jury that is your right of allocution?
MR. WOODS: Yes.
THE COURT: You also understand that in this phase of the trial you have the right
to present mitigation testimony?
MR. WOODS: Yes.
THE COURT: Testimony to persuade the jury that the right choice is leniency, from
your perspective?
MR. WOODS: Yes.
Id. (quoting Verbatim Report of Proceedings, State v. Woods, at 5737).
230. Id. at 611, 23 P.3d at 1074. It is interesting that the court would seize upon Mr.
Woods' attorney's remarks made during argument for a continuance in order to have Mr.
Woods' competency evaluated, as determinative of Woods' wish to volunteer for the death pen-
Seattle University Law Review
Woods wanted to volunteer for the death penalty, by asking the jury
to impose it, "unequivocally evidences his intent to waive his right to
present mitigating evidence. ' 231' Accordingly, Mr. Woods' decision to
volunteer not only exceeded the "voluntary, intelligent, and knowing"
standard, it also complied with the enhanced procedures that surpass
what the Constitution requires. 2
Between the time of his sentencing hearing and the mandatory
appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Mr. Woods changed his
mind and no longer wished to volunteer for the death penalty. 233 After
applying the above standards, the court focused on the trial record
created at the sentencing hearing and held that "there is sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury conclusion that leniency was not merited. ,23
4
The Woods majority, when faced with the dilemma of a volun-
teer who changes his mind, chose to institute a rule that Justice Utter
previously characterized as an "unfair" option.235  In addition, the
Woods solution to the dilemma highlights a central concern with vol-
unteers. When a volunteer dominates the process, the death penalty
scheme does not operate as intended; however, when the volunteer at-
tempts to return control of the process back to those who the legisla-
ture intended to vest control, it is too late. By making the volunteer's
initial choice determinative of the entire path taken by Washington's
death penalty scheme, Washington runs the risk of realizing another
of Justice Utter's predicted problems: the possibility of executing an
innocent person. 36
5. Limiting the Choices of Defense Counsel
When defendants volunteer for execution, their lawyers are
placed in an unfair predicament. Most lawyers who choose to repre-
sent capital defendants are opposed to capital punishment; thus, in the
alty. The court also found that Mr. Woods' resistance to the continuance was equally indicative
of his desire to waive mitigation. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d at 603, 23 P.3d at 1070 ("Woods argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his defense counsel's motion for a one-week continuance be-
tween the guilt and penalty phases. Woods now asserts that this continuance was necessary in
order for his counsel to have his competency addressed. He claims that because of this error, his
death sentence should be vacated." (emphasis added)).
234. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d at 615, 23 P.3d 1046. The court emphasized Mr. Woods' vol-
unteer status during the penalty phase, stating, "Woods essentially implored the jury to impose
the death penalty." Id.
235. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d at 43, 838 P.2d at 107 (Utter, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 34, 838 P.2d at 103 ("Given the physical and psychological pressures felt by
those on death row, the lure of ceasing to resist the death penalty may be as great for the innocent
as for the guilty.").
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case of a volunteer, there is a forced choice between the attorney's own
interests in opposing the death penalty and counsel's obligation to"seek the lawful objectives of her client. ' 237 As one commentator has
observed, in reality, the capital defense attorney who represents a vol-
unteer is faced with four options:
First, the attorney can try to have her client deemed incompe-
tent, thereby eliminating the client's authority to decide what is
in his best interests. Second, the attorney can acquiesce to the
client's wishes by complying with his requests or withdrawing
from the case. Third, the attorney can outright defy her client's
wishes and act without the client's consent, which will likely
lead to discharge. Lastly, the attorney can use persuasive or co-
ercive tactics to try to convince her client to change his mind.238
It is next to impossible to find that a defendant is incompetent.
The standard is a strict one:
The defendant's inability to recognize facts that might make his
punishment unlawful or unjust was of no consequence as long as
he understood that he was to be executed and why he was being
punished ... [S]hort of rabid insanity, incompetence is a diffi-
cult burden to meet and mental disability rarely precludes a
finding for competent decision-making.239
The second option, to completely defy a client's plea for death
and present the mitigating evidence anyway, is not appropriate ei-
ther.240 Defying a client's wishes goes against an attorney's pledge to"seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available
means." 241  This puts the defending attorney in an ethical quandary
because the attorney who does not comply with the client's wishes
could be fired, leaving the defendant without representation. 212 With-
237. White, supra note 175, at 855-56 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-101(A)(1) (1982)).
238. Chandler, supra note 102, at 1913.
239. Id. at 1914; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (concluding that a
client must be nearly catatonic before he is actually considered incompetent). But see State v.
Marshall, 144 Wash. 2d 266, 27 P.3d 192 (2001), where the Washington Supreme Court deter-
mined that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a mandatory full-blown competency hearing
after the defendant made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in a capital prosecution on the ba-
sis that he was not mentally competent at the time the plea was entered. Id. at 281. On remand
to the trial court, the same judge who declared Marshall competent initially found him incompe-
tent after a formal hearing on the issue. Olsen, supra note 122. The prosecutor decided not to
seek the death penalty after remand to the trial court.
240. Id. at 1916.
241. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (2001); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.3 cmt. 1 (2001) ("A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
242. Chandler, supra note 102, at 1916.
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drawal by the attorney is yet another alternative for defense counsel;
however, appointed attorneys must get a court's approval to withdraw,
and are usually discouraged from withdrawing from a case despite
their predicament.243
Counsel who attempt to change a volunteer's mind find an addi-
tional struggle. Many defense attorneys who choose to put pressure
on their clients to fight for life think that they are acting in the defen-
dant's best interests.244 These attorneys believe that because of the
many psychological factors that affect a prisoner on death row, a capi-
tal defendant may be unable to make a competent decision.245 Other
attorneys feel that they have an obligation to the defendant's family
members who will suffer if there is an execution, and that they have an
obligation to society to make sure that the death penalty is not im-
posed inappropriately.246 This persuasion, however, could be con-
strued as coercive, as the attorney is frequently the capital defendant's
only meaningful contact from the outside.247
Beyond an initial attempt to talk the client out of electing execu-
tion, there is no monolithic voice among experienced capital defenders
about how to handle the question of clients who seek death. Accord-
ing to one assessment, the greatest numbers of attorneys who do death
penalty work "acknowledge the ethical problems inherent in opposing
a client's wishes," but none could "imagine a case in which he would
voluntarily allow a capital defendant to submit to execution. 248
In an article published about a series of focused in-depth inter-
views conducted in 1998 with twenty lawyers for death row inmates,
there was wide disagreement about the appropriate approach in deal-
ing with volunteers. 249 The author indicates that the interviews "sug-
gest that there are no hard-and-fast rules for determining the ethics of
volunteering; instead it is a fluid, ongoing, and uniquely individual-
ized process. 25 ° The divergent approaches to volunteering include''respect the client's wishes" to "unavoidable triage" to "question his
competency" to "withdraw immediately" to "fight it every step of the
way. )251
243. Id. at 1916; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2001).
244. White, supra note 175, at 858.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 859.
247. Chandler, supra note 102, at 1917.
248. White, supra note 175, at 861.
249. Harrington, supra note 204, at 849.
250. Id. at 873.
251. Id. at 877.
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A lawyer is representative, advisor, advocate, negotiator, inter-
mediary, evaluator, officer of the legal system, and a public citizen.252
A lawyer, as a citizen, has a particular responsibility to preserve thequality of justice. 253 A lawyer is precluded from doing a good job if
the attorney must choose to act in one capacity, but not another. It is
in the public interest to keep a lawyer from having to make such a de-
cision, because whether a lawyer chooses to defy the client, or help the
client achieve death, the attorney cannot, in the meantime, preserve
the quality of justice.
B. Strategic Choices and Presentation of Mitigation Evidence
Mitigation evidence is not presented when a defense team is
forced to make a strategic or tactical decision regarding presentation of
such evidence. There may be justifiable reasons, based on existing
law, for a defense team to be forced to make this "strategic choice."
For example, a common reason why such evidence may not be pre-
sented is the existence of rebuttal evidence more prejudicial to the de-
fendant than the mitigating evidence. This strategic choice is, at least
in part, a result of the way Washington has structured the rules with
regard to the presentation of mitigation evidence in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial.
According to Washington's death penalty statute regarding thesentencing hearing in a capital trial, any relevant evidence shall be
admitted which the court "deems to have probative value regardless of
its admissibility under the rules of evidence."2"4 The Washington Su-
preme Court has limited this broad rule only to evidence of mitigating
factors.25s Thus, mitigation evidence may be presented in a manner
guided only by the standard of relevance.
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecution's presentation of
evidence of the statutory aggravating factors is "restricted to meet the
evidentiary, and state and federal constitutional standards [articulated
by the court]. '"256 In addition, "evidence of nonstatutory aggravating
factors must be limited to the defendant's criminal record, evidence
that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., scope, and terminology (1998).
253. Id.
254. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(3) (2002) (emphasis added).
255. State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 642, 683 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1984) (known as
Bartholomew II); State v. Clark, 143 Wash. 2d 731, 780, 24 P.3d 1006, 1030-31 (2001).
256. Bartholomew II, 101 Wash. 2d at 642, 683 P.2d at 1087. The statutory aggravating
factors are those of WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020.
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rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant. 2 7 The prosecu-
tion's use of rebuttal evidence is allowed to be admitted
only if it is relevant to a matter raised in mitigation by the de-
fendant. Evidence might be relevant, for instance, if it casts
doubt upon the reliability of defendant's mitigating evidence.
[The supreme court does] not intend, however, that the prosecu-
tion be permitted to produce any evidence it cares to so long as it
points to some element of rebuttal no matter how slight or inci-
dental. The court in determining whether to admit the prosecu-
tion's evidence should apply a balancing test similar to that con-
templated by [Evidence Rule] 403.258
Thus, the prosecution is limited in its case in chief to presenting
evidence of the facts and circumstances of the crime and the defen-
dant's criminal record. According to the rules of evidence, the defen-
dant may then introduce any relevant mitigation evidence. After the
defendant's presentation, the prosecutor may rebut. The court must
then perform a balancing test, weighing the relative probative and
prejudicial values of the proposed rebuttal evidence before allowing
presentation of such evidence.
An example of how this strategic choice might work is when the
defendant introduces evidence relating to the likelihood that he or she"will pose a danger to others in the future. ' 219 If a defendant presents
mitigation evidence indicating that he or she will not pose a danger in
the future, the prosecution can rebut with evidence indicating the con-
trary. As long as the prosecution's evidence does not unfairly preju-
dice the defendant, such rebuttal is permitted. If the defense believes
that the rebuttal evidence would be more harmful to the defendant
than the benefit of presenting future dangerousness evidence, then the
defense may decide not to present the mitigating evidence at all.
Therefore, this "strategic choice" prevents the presentation of mitigat-
ing evidence. This weakness in Washington statutory wording creates
a Hobson's choice for the defendant concerning mitigation. If the
statute more clearly enumerated other possible mitigation factors, de-
fendants would not have to decide whether to open the door to a
broader character assassination by the prosecutor in response to an at-
tempt to show that the defendant poses no future danger.
257. Bartholomew II, 101 Wash. 2d at 642, 683 P.2d 1087.
258. Id. at 643, 683 P.2d at 1047 (quoting State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 197-98,
654 P.2d 1170 (1982)).
259. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(8). The "likelihood that the defendant will pose a
danger to others in the future" is often referred to as "future dangerousness."
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While there are justifiable reasons for a defense team to decide
not to present certain mitigating evidence, the use of "strategic choice"
should not be abused or misconstrued. For example, at one point in
the litigation surrounding James Elledge's decision to volunteer for the
death penalty, his attorney argued that the choice was made not to in-
troduce mitigation evidence because the strategy was to have Mr.
Elledge be executed.260 Pursuing such a "strategy" is inconsistent with
the proper function of Washington's death penalty statute, is contrary
to the intent of the legislature in creating that statute, is against public
policy, and is a disingenuous way to approach a difficult problem of
legal representation. 261  Indeed, framing the tactics used by a death
penalty volunteer as "strategic choices" is actually a methodology that
confuses and blurs the issue in an attempt to give volunteering for the
death penalty an appearance of legitimacy.
The choice not to present a particular piece of mitigating evidence
should not be confused with the failure to present any such evidence.
An attorney should not let the mere presence of rebuttal evidence de-
termine the presentation of mitigation information. When a jury has
both aggravating and mitigating evidence before it, jurors are able to
make an individualized and reliable sentence determination. It has
been suggested that "mitigating circumstances are almost always dis-
coverable and their effective enumeration and presentation almost
guarantees the defendant will be spared execution in all but the most
grisly crimes. 262
While choosing not to present a portion of mitigating evidence
may be strategically sound, confusing this ability to choose with fail-
ure to present mitigation is hazardous.263 The complete failure to pre-
sent mitigation evidence is arguably only a result of a volunteer client
or ineffective assistance of counsel. When a false "strategic choice" is
made, the outcome is the same as the volunteer or ineffective assis-
tance of counsel scenarios. This is an arbitrary and capricious applica-
tion and nonindividualized and unreliable imposition of Washington's
death penalty.
260. See Defendant's Response to the Motion of Kathryn Ross for Reconsideration of the
Trial Court's Denial of Her Request to Appear as Amicus Curie, No. 98-1-00798-7, at 4 ("The
fact that the defendant [Elledge] wishes to receive the death penalty provides strong strategic
reasons to forgo putting on mitigating evidence.").
261. See discussion infra Part V.
262. Levinson, supra note 9, at 173 (citing to Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 342, and 365
(1993).
263. This would be true just as the prosecution may decide for strategic reasons not to pre-
sent a particular aspect of aggravation or a portion of the circumstances of the crime.
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Presentation of Mitigation
Evidence
Ineffective assistance of counsel sometimes prevents the intro-
duction of mitigation evidence. The importance of effective assistance
of counsel in the adversarial process is heightened in a capital trial.264
Ineffective assistance of counsel prevents the adversarial nature of the
criminal justice process from occurring.
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in death penalty
litigation is not a novel one. The current standard for determining
whether an attorney has provided ineffective assistance of counsel is
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, a case involving the sentencing
phase of a capital case.26 Defense counsel, whose client was uncoop-
erative most of the time, had conducted only a minimal amount of in-
vestigation into possible mitigating circumstances and ultimately de-
clined to present any mitigation evidence.266 In denying the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the Court adopted a two-pronged test to
apply when analyzing this type of case.267 First, the defendant must
show that the defense counsel's performance was deficient, and thus
not the "counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment.26' Second, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a"reasonable probability" that the attorney's deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome.269
The same day the Strickland rule was announced, the Court an-
nounced its decision in United States v. Cronic.271 In Cronic, the Court
considered a "check-kiting" case where defense counsel had only
twenty-five days to prepare and was inexperienced in handling com-
plex criminal trials.2 71 The Court proclaimed that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel is "the right of the accused
to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing. '272 Thus, "if the process loses its character as a
confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee [of
counsel] is violated. '273 Accordingly, where defense counsel is defi-
264. Simply put, "[t]he quality of counsel is often a matter of life or death for the capital
defendant." Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1924 (1994).
265. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
266. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672-73.
267. Id. at 687.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (both decisions were announced on May 14, 1984).
271. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649.
272. Id. at 655-56.
273. Id. at 656-57.
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cient and fails to subject the prosecution's case to worthwhile
adversarial testing, the prejudicial effect on the defendant can be
presumed and counsel is ineffective.2 74
The United States Supreme Court has recently handed down de-
cisions that revisit issues relating to the guidelines for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. In a case from the 2000 term, Williams v. Taylor,
the Court remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing after de-
termining that trial counsel's failure to introduce available evidence in
mitigation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strick-
land. 276 For a brief period, it appeared as though the Supreme Court
might have "raise[d] the floor for effective assistance of counsel in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial." 277 But a mere two years later, in
Bell v. Cone, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding that a de-
fense attorney's failure to present mitigation evidence and a closing ar-
gument amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.2 78 In consider-
ing the imposition of Tennessee's death penalty, the Sixth Circuit had
applied both Strickland and Cronic.279 The Supreme Court disagreedthat Cronic applied °.2 " This was a rejection of the Sixth Circuit's de-
termination that "[w]here mitigating evidence was available, but not
adequately investigated and not presented at sentencing, this 'does not
reflect a strategic decision, but rather an abdication of advocacy. '' 281
Instead, the Court applied a traditional Strickland analysis and refused
to disturb the state court's finding that counsel had not performed
deficiently. 82 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's ruling in Cone does
not provide the needed clarification regarding the circumstances under
which the Sixth Amendment effective assistance of counsel require-
ment entails the presentation of mitigation evidence.
In the last decade, three death sentences in Washington have
been overturned by the federal courts based on ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that involved, at least in part, failure or neglect regard-
ing mitigation evidence.28 a Since mitigation is essential to Washing-
274. Id. at 658-59.
275. Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362 (2000); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
276. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398-99.
277. Bill Christman, Chandler v. United States: Does the Defense Attorney Have a Legal
Obligation to Present Mitigation Evidence in Eleventh Circuit Death Penalty Cases? 18 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 563, 580 (2001).
278. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, -_ (2002).
279. Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 977 (6th Cir. 2001).
280. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at .
281. Id. at 978 (quoting Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 1997)).
282. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at _.
283. ACLU of Washington, supra note 66, at 9-12 (citing to State v. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d
784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986), by and through Ramseyer v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), affd 64 F. 3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 771 F. Supp. 1520 (W.D.
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ton's death penalty scheme, the adversarial process that provides for
its presentation is equally vital.
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE TO THE WASHINGTON STATUTORY
SCHEME
The following proposals all advocate for a proportional, rational
consideration to seek the death penalty, to maintain an adversarial bal-
ance once the death penalty is sought, and to ensure that if the death
penalty is finally imposed, it comports with the intent of the legisla-
ture.
First, for the purpose of assisting both in the collection and pres-
entation of mitigation evidence, the court should appoint a mitigation
specialist in every case where the death penalty is a possible sentence.
A mitigation specialist has been described as "an individual, who spe-
cializes in compiling potentially mitigating information about the ac-
cused in a capital case," who is appointed to present favorable evi-
dence about the defendant to the factfinder in the penalty phase of a
trial.2"4 One commentator came up with an appropriate definition: "A
person qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, or training as a men-
tal health or sociology professional to investigate, evaluate, and present
psychosocial and other mitigating evidence to persuade the sentencing
authority in a capital case that a death sentence is an inappropriate
punishment for the defendant."285
A mitigation specialist can investigate maternity and birth re-
cords, school records, military records, medical records, prison re-
cords, employment history, physical and psychological testing, evi-
dence of alcohol and drug abuse, and agencies.286 The mitigation
specialist can conduct interviews with the defendant's immediate fam-
Wash. 1991), affd 974 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1992); Mak v. Blodgett, 754 F. Supp. 1490 (W.D.
Wash. 1991), affd 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951, 122 L. Ed. 2d 742,
113 S. Ct. 1363 (1993)). Each of these cases had survived mandatory review by the Washington
Supreme Court. ACLU of Washington, supra note 66, at 9-12. The U.S. District Court opin-
ion setting aside the death sentence states that "[i]t is clear that the Washington Supreme Court
did not fulfill the essential function of ensuring even-handed, rational, and consistent imposition
of death sentences under Washington law." Id. at 9 (citing to Harris by and through Ramseyer
v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994)). In Mak and then in Harris, the
Ninth Circuit made reference to a "cumulative effect" principle in assessing attorney errors that
prejudiced the defendant. Levinson, supra note 9, at 166-67.
284. State v. Langley, 839 P.2d 692, 697 (Or. 1992); see also Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If
You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 359, 365 (1997).
285. Tomes, supra note 284, at 367.
286. Id. at 369.
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ily, extended family, friends, teachers, neighbors, and others who may
help with the development of a file on the defendant's character.8 7
This proposal suggests that the Washington statute provide a
means for the court to order the appointment of mitigation specialists
in capital cases. The practice of other states could serve as a model.
Virginia allows for the appointment of an expert to determine"whether there are any other factors in mitigation relating to the his-
tory or character of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the offence.""' Ohio directs the court to provide a miti-
gation specialist to any indigent defendants charged with aggravated
murder, as long as the services are reasonably necessary for suitable
representation.8 9 Ohio sets out factors for the court to consider in de-
ciding if the appointment of a mitigation specialist is necessary: "(1)
the value of the expert assistance to the defendant's proper representa-
tion at either the guilt or the sentencing phase of the trial, and (2) the
availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions
as the expert assistance sought. 290
Second, after a person is charged with aggravated first-degree
murder, there should be a mandatory period where mitigation evi-
dence is collected to assist the prosecution in deciding whether to seek
the death penalty. This mandatory period would also allow time for
defendants to cool off, to consider their defenses, and to weigh the
consequences of evidence that they may or may not present.291 This
would prevent reoccurrence of what happened to a defendant such as
James Elledge, who was able to fast-track his execution.
A decision to seek the death penalty should be an informed one.
It should consider not only the heinousness of the crime but also of the
circumstances of each individual defendant.292 The decision should be
287. Id.
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Anderson 2002); see also Tomes, supra note 284, at
373.
289. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.024 (Michie 2002); see also Tomes, supra note 284, at
372-73.
290. Tomes, supra note 284, at 373 (citing State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 291 (Ohio
1984)).
291. This allows time for defense counsel to develop trust and rapport with the client in
order to provide effective representation and to gather the sometimes sensitive information that
might be used to prepare a mitigation packet. CASE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 48,
section V. C. (entitled "Mitigation: Length of Time Required to Conduct Investigation").
292. The Constitution Project, Mandatory Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty
53-54 (2001). See also Report of the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment (2002) [hereinafter
Illinois Commission Report], which suggests that the Attorney General and the State's Attorneys
Association "should adopt recommendations as to the procedures State's Attorneys should follow
in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty." Id. at 82. In Washington, where prosecu-
tors are elected, guidelines seem critical. There are noticeable differences between the approach
of prosecutors in the state. For example, Pierce County, Washington, has pushed for the death
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compared to other cases of the same charge and crime to see if the
penalty is fair in that particular case. Information about a defendant
may take time to surface, as it did in Mr. Elledge's case.293 In that
case, because the defendant was able to expedite the process and cloud
the jury's vision of who he really was, none of that information sur-
faced; if properly considered early on by the prosecuting attorney, that
information could have warranted a life sentence.294
If there were a mandatory time period during which the
prosecuting attorney is compelled to analyze the case itself, it would
alleviate any fears that the process to take a person's life is being
rushed. In New York, there is a 120-day period specified for just such
an analysis.211
Part of this analysis must involve the court's proportionality re-
view. In New Jersey, the Supreme Court established a database that
contained judicial and other relevant information on death-eligible
cases and how they compare to each other. 2  However implemented,
as long as the information has the time and the means to reach those
who make the decision to seek the death penalty, the system can pro-
ceed to function as intended.
Third, if a competent defendant refuses to present mitigation
evidence, the mitigation specialist should present that evidence under
the court's direction. The need for mitigation specialists is indispen-
sable in volunteer cases. This input should be as integral to the proc-
ess as is the mandatory appellate review stage, because in the volunteer
context it is the only way that the evidence will be heard.297 A mitiga-
tion specialist would be an important step to maintaining a propor-
tional and adversarial environment.
Fourth, the language of the statute, rather than a separate jury
instruction, should include a provision that sets forth the jury's re-
penalty in more than twenty cases (including the recent Robert Yates case) in the past fifteen
years, prompting a Seattle newspaper to characterize the county as "a capital-punishment ma-
chine." See Lise Olsen, Pierce County Known for Toughness in Capital Cases, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 1, 2000, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/ser0l.shtml.
An August 2001 article also noted that of the eight men sentenced to death, five had their sen-
tences reversed, one of the five was actually released, and only three remain on death row, with
two of those still going through the appeals process. Olsen, supra note 47.
293. See Olsen, supra note 47.
294. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
295. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40.
296. David Baldus & George Woodworth, Proportionality: The View of the Special Master,
6 CHANCE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATISTICS AND COMPUTING 9-17 (1993). An in-depth
examination of proportionality is beyond the scope of this article. For a critique of comparative
proportionality review in Washington, see Bruce Gilbert, Comment, Comparative Proportionality
Review: Will the Ends, Will the Means, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 593 (1995).
297. See generally Carter, supra note 35.
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sponsibility to assess any information presented about the defendant
or the crime that suggests that life without parole is the appropriate
disposition. 2" The scope of prosecutorial rebuttal after presentation of
mitigation evidence should be narrow and limited only to contesting
the falsity of defense allegations.
Fifth, the clemency board should be vested with specific author-
ity to receive information in mitigation that bears on commutation of a
death sentence.299 One panel of experts recommends that "the clem-
ency decisionmaking process should take into account all factors that
might lead the decisionmaker to conclude that death is not the appro-
priate punishment." 300
Finally, in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, defense counsel,
or independent counsel on behalf of the court, should be held to a
duty to argue for the defendant's life. The American Bar Association
provides this guidance: "The goal at the sentencing phase is to help
the jury see the client as someone they do not want to kill." '' If any
balance is to be preserved in the implementation of a penalty of death,
the lawyer will not be asked to advocate for that which the State will
be requesting already. This would make the defense lawyer's advo-
cacy useless. The presentation of mitigation evidence and the closing
argument are the only opportunities to really "humanize" the defen-
dant and explain to the jury why this person's life should be spared." 2
The attorney is an officer of the judicial system. To put the at-
torney in a position where advocacy contradicts proportionality and
totally eviscerates the adversarial process contravenes not only public
298. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070 (2002). The Illinois Commission also recommended
that two items be added to the list of five specifically enumerated statutory factors: "6. Defen-
dant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse; 7. Defendant suf-
fers from reduced mental capacity." Illinois Commission Report, supra note 292, at 141. An
ABA Report addresses this issue by focusing on enhancing clarity in jury instructions and in-
cludes the provision that "[t]rial courts should instruct jurors that a juror may return a life sen-
tence, even in the absence of any mitigating factor and even where an aggravating factor has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, if the juror does not believe that the defendant should
receive the death penalty. ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Death With-
out Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty in the United States 35
(2001).
299. We offer this suggestion with some reluctance because the operation of the current
clemency process under the auspices of Governor Gary Locke has allowed presentation of all
pertinent information to the board and to the Governor's office. Unless this procedure is memo-
rialized, however, that may not always be the case.
300. ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 298.
301. American Bar Association, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, cmt. 11.8 (1989).
302. See Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Gary Bradford Cone 6 (2002) (citing to Tennessee Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Tools for the Ultimate Trial: The TACDL Death Penalty Defense
Manual 14.94 (1992)).
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policy but also judicial policy. When there is a sentencing phase in-
volving death, someone must argue for life; otherwise, the sentencing
phase is useless. Removing the heavy burden of a defense lawyer, who
may be forced to decide between appropriate advocacy and the suici-
dal will of the client, would help to maintain the balance that is needed
to avoid arbitrariness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The presentation of mitigation evidence is a crucial requirement
for any death penalty statute. Washington's legislature has recognized
this and has crafted such a statute. Legislative intent is undermined in
situations where mitigation is not presented. When a defendant vol-
unteers, when ineffective assistance of counsel occurs, or when a stra-
tegic choice is compelled that prevents the presentation of mitigation
evidence, Washington's death penalty statute fails to operate properly.
In particular, the situation of the death penalty volunteer is contrary to
Washington's established public policies of disallowing suicide and
giving effect to the rights of jurors. Washington must lift the stamp of
"suicide-by-penalty" that it has awarded itself and implement a re-
formed death penalty statute that protects both societal interests and
the interests of capital defendants.
In order to prevent the breakdown of Washington's death pen-
alty statute, several proposals should be implemented. Mitigation
specialists should be appointed in every potential capital case. A
mandatory waiting period before the decision to seek the death penalty
should ensue after the prosecutor charges aggravated first-degree
murder. Where a defendant "volunteers," the mitigation specialist
should testify at the direction of the court regarding any relevant miti-
gation evidence. Relevant statutes should be amended to clarify the
responsibilities of jurors and the clemency board. Finally, defense
counsel should be held to a standard requiring a duty to argue for the
life of the client. By adopting these proposals, crucial mitigating evi-
dence will be presented in a manner that will allow Washington's
death penalty statute to operate as it was intended.
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